LAWS(RAJ)-1988-2-9

SUKHRAJ SINGH Vs. HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

Decided On February 20, 1988
SUKHRAJ SINGH Appellant
V/S
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition arises under extraordinary circumstances and is based on allegations of deep intricacies suspected rivalries, intolerance of disloyally on jejune affairs, at the highest alter of judicial functionaries in the. State. It contains allegations as to how the Registrar of High Court appointed by one Chief Justice becomes an eye sore of other judges with whom he does not toe in line or does not fulfil their wishes.

(2.) THE case of the petitioner is that he was a practising lawyer at Jodhpur when he was offered an appointment to the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service and he joined on November 21, 1977 as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Udaipur. He was confirmed in the month of November, 1979 after the completion of probation period. He was appointed as Registrar of Rajasthan High Court in the month of November, 1983 by the then Chief Justice Shri P. K. Banerjee. Shri P. K. Banerjee retired on September 30, 1985 and the petitioner remained posted as Registrar until October 10. 1985.

(3.) IT has been further alleged that during the course of inspection of record the petitioner found that the statement of Shri Munni Lal Garg was recorded with regard to charge No. 1 and two witnesses namely Gunwant Lal and Mishri Lal Gupta were recorded respectively with regard to charge. No 2 Copies of the statements of the above witnesses have been filed and marked as Exs. 8, 9, and 10 respectively. According to the petitioner the perusal of these statements would show that Shri Munni Lal Garg did not utter a single word against the petitioner in support of charge No. 1 and he only narrated the factum of purchase. Thus, there was no evidence to sustain the charge of seeling the house without prior permission. As regards the other witnesses with regard to charge No. 2 it has been submitted by the petitioner that besides inherent contradictions, improbabilities and the unnatural conduct, all that has been said by them is hear-say evidence. Thus except hear-say evidence there was no direct indirect or even circumstantial evidence to support charge No. 2 against the petitioner.-