MADAN, J. - (1.)RAJASTHAN Pharmacy Council (appellant) by filing this special appeal has assailed the judgment dated 8. 12. 2000 of the learned Single Judge whereby the writ petition of the Council was dismissed upholding the Government order 22. 1. 2000 withdrawing its permission granted to S. C. Pant to work as Registrar of the Council.
(2.)ADMITTED facts are that appellant Rajasthan Pharmacy Council (for short, "council") was constituted by State Government by order dated 11. 08. 1978 as a body corporate. The State Government in exercise of its powers under Section 26 of the Pharmacy Council Act, 1948 (for brevity "the Act") appointed Mr. Mohd. Ishaq as first Registrar of the Council for first four years of constitution with its pleasure, and accordingly Mr. Ishaq continued as first Registrar from August 1978 to August, 1982 in addition to his own substantive appointment as Administrative Officer in Mobile Surgical Unit of the Medical & Officer in Mobile Surgical Unit of the Medical & Health Department of the State Government. Thereafter though the State Govt. appointed Shri Mukesh Agrawal as Registrar of the Council in place of Mr. Ishaq vide order dated 10. 01. 1983 but that order was challenged in writ petition wherein direction was allegedly issued to convene a meeting of the Executive of the Council so as to appoint Registrar, and pursuant to that direction the Executive Committee in its meeting on 14. 04. 1983 resolved to appoint Shri B. M. Sharma on officiating basis till regularly appointed candidate was made available and thereby Shri Mukesh Agrawal ceased to function as Registrar. However, pursuant to advertisement Mr. S. C. Pant was regularly appointed by order dated 15. 02. 1986 as Registrar but on part time basis. It is pertinent to mention that admittedly during his appointment as Registrar on part time basis Shri Pant was substantive Officer of the State Government having been working as Senior Lecturer and duly promoted as Reader in Public Health Training Institute and that being so, he has been continuing to discharge his duties as such in addition to his assignment as Registrar on part time basis. Similarly it is not in dispute rather admitted by the Council that Shri Pant continued to discharge all functions and duties of his regular employment with the State Government firstly as Senior Lecturer and subsequently or promotion as Reader with the Public Health Training Institute during office hours from 8 a. m. to 2 p. m. daily in addition to his part time assignment as Registrar of the Council during its office hours from 4 p. m. to 6 p. m. till 1. 4. 1999 when it got changed to 11 a. m. to 6 p. m. i. e. full day office hours. However, it is the case of the Council that on 28. 3. 2000 the respondent No. 2 telephonically directed Shri Pant to relinquish post of Registrar and this telephonic communication was conveyed by Shri Pant to the Council. Ultimately, a communication was sent by the State Government on 1. 4. 2000 directing Shri Pant to relinquish the post of Registrar pursuant to order dated 22. 1. 2000 whereby original order dt. 10. 2. 1986 lending services of Shri Pant to work as Registrar of the Council was revoked, against which the council filed writ petition before the learned Single Judge who after show cause notice and upon reply thereto besides rejoinder, heard both the parties at admission stage and dismissed the writ petition by the impugned judgment. Hence, this special appeal.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the entire material on record and considered rival contentions, we find no merit in this special appeal. Our conclusions are thus.

As regard the objection of the State Government as to the necessary party, learned counsel for the council relying upon the decisions in Uditnarayan Singh vs. Board of Revenue (1) and MV Ravindranath vs. Union of India (2) contended that as per dictum of law laid down in catena of decisions of the Apex Court, it is settled law that necessary party is the person in whose absence the relief sought in petition cannot be granted; that if a necessary or appropriate party has not been impleaded instead of dismissing the petition straight-away, the Court must give an opportunity for impleading any such necessary or proper party. In Uditnarayan's case (supra) before the High Court in a writ for certiorari, only the Tribunal whose order was sought to be quashed was made a party but the persons who were parties before the lower Tribunal and in whose favour the impugned order was passed were not joined as parties, the Apex Court held that the petition was incompetent and had been rightly rejected by the High Court; and further that the request that the Supreme Court may, at the stage of appeal direct them to be made parties and remand the matter to the High Court for disposal, was belated and could not, therefore, be-granted.

Similarly in the case of MV Ravindranath (supra) the claim made by the appellants was dismissed by the Tribunal on technical ground of non impleadment of necessary parties without considering the matter on merits, therefore, the Apex Court remitted the matter back to the Tribunal with the direction that it would allow the appellants to implead all other persons as respondents to the petition who are likely to be affected by the ultimate decision rendered by it. In our considered view, the cases cited on behalf of the Council having distinguished facts do not at all help in advancing its case because here are the different facts and the impugned order of withdrawing the sanction to continue as Registrar of the council ought to have been assailed by SC Pant as it was passed against him and he could have been aggrieved to it but he has not come forward and appears to have been playing the game behind the curtain.

As regards the reasons offered by the State Government by way of justification to the issuance of the impugned order against S. C. Pant, Shri Singh cited the decisions in S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan (3), Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Officer (4) and S. N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India (5) and contended that the learned Single Judge committed an error in not entertaining the plea regarding violation of principles of natural justice.

(3.)IN M. S. Gill's case (supra) the Apex Court held that statutory order entailing adverse consequence needs to be judged only on the basis of reasons contained therein and not on the basis of reasons invented and offered by way of counter affidavit, whereas in S. L. Kapoor's case (supra) it was held that non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudicial to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary and similarly in S. N. Mukherjee's case the Apex Court held that the requirement to record reasons can be regarded as one of principles of natural justice.
In S. L. Kapoor's case (supra) the status, rights and responsibilities and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office since creates sufficient interest, in the Municipal Committee and their loss, if superseded, entails civil consequences so as to justify an insistence upon the observance of the principles of natural justice before an order of supersession is passed, as envisaged in Section 238 (1) of the Punjab Municipal Act.

We may emphasize that in S. N. Mukherjee's case (supra) it has also been held that with regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial of quasi-judicial functions of the legislature, while conferring the said power may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by such administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement, and such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment, and that the public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons and the said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. In the instant case firstly the impugned order has been challenged in the writ petition by the Council who as rightly held by the learned Single Judge has, no locus standi to approach this Court, and further the impugned order is not a statutory order nor it was passed by the State in exercise of any judicial or quasi judicial power either under the Pharmacy Act or service Rules nor any statutory provisions have been pointed out by the appellants necessitating to record reasons before passing such an administrative order withdrawing he services of S. C. Pant who was admittedly official of the State Government and whose services were given only on lending basis for a particular period and whose services have not been withdrawn before that permitted period but after expiry of that period. Hence, we do not find any merit in the case of the Council for non observance of natural justice or requirement to record reasons before passing the impugned order.