G.S.SINGHVI, J. - (1.)IN this appeal appellant has prayed that order dated 21-1-1994 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Original Contempt Petition No. 888 of 1993 'malook Singh and others v. A. S. Chatha' be set aside and the contempt petition filed by Malook Singh and others be dismissed. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of this Letters Patent Appeal has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents and by this order we are deciding this preliminary objection. In order to decide this, it is proper to make reference to some of the facts. Malook Singh and others filed Civil Writ Petition No. 2780 of 1980 claiming seniority on the basis of total length of service. This writ petition came to be allowed by a learned Single Judge on December 6, 1991. Letters Patent Appeal No. 555 of 1992 filed by the State of Punjab against the order of the learned Single Judge was dismissed by the Division Bench on January 4, 1993. Special Leave petition (Civil) No. 7513 of 1993 was dismissed by the Supreme Court on July 16, 1993. Thereafter original petitioners in the writ petition made representations for implementation of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 6. 12. 1991. According to them, despite the representations and notice through counsel, the Government did not implement the order of the learned Single Judge. For the reasons Malook Singh and others filed contempt petition which came to be registered as Civil Original Contempt Petition No. 888 of 1993. A notice of show cause as to why contempt proceedings be not initiated was issued by the learned Single Judge, in response to which the present appellant filed a written-statement. Therein he pleaded that in view of the various decisions of the Supreme Court, seniority cannot be assigned from the date of adhoc appointment and that it was not possible for the respondent in the contempt petition to allow benefit of adhoc service towards seniority to the petitioners. On 17. 12. 1993, counsel for the non-petitioners in the contempt petition sought adjournment so as to enable him to seek instructions with regard to full compliance of the order of the Court. On 24. 12. 1993, the case was adjourned at the request of the Advocate General and once again it was adjourned to 17. 1. 1994. On 14. 1. 1994, the State Government issued a seniority list. When the matter finally came up before the learned Single Judge, he expressed the opinion that action taken by the respondent prima facie amounts to contempt. Notwithstanding this, the learned Single Judge adjourned the case to 18. 2. 1994 to enable the non-petitioner in the contempt petition to fully and effectually comply with the order of the Court. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge that the Letters Patent Appeal has been filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent.
(2.)WHEN Letters Patent Appeal No. 148 of 1994 came up for consideration before the Division Bench along with the Civil Misc. application No. 257 of 1994, it was given out by the Advocate General of Punjab that the office order dated 14. 2. 1994 seniority has been assigned to the writ petitioners according to the date of their initial appointment and the date of regularisation has been mentioned in the seniority as a matter of caution and in obedience to the order of the Division bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 555 of 1992 decided on 4. 1. 1993. By taking note of this statement of the learned Advocate General, Punjab, the Court ordered the issue of notice of motion subject to the objection regarding maintainability of appeal. The Court also stayed further proceedings pending before the learned Single Judge.
Mr. P. S. Patwalia, learned counsel for the respondents, argued that the Letters Patent Appeal by the appellant is not maintainable in view of the plain and unambiguous language of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Mr. Patwalia argued that no final order has been passed by the learned Single, Judge in the contempt petition punishing the appellant and, therefore, the appellant has no locus standi to file this appeal. He submitted that only a notice to show cause has been issued by the learned Single Judge calling upon the present appellant to show cause as to why the proceedings for contempt of Court be not initiated against him. He argued that order passed by the teamed Single Judge on 21. 1. 1994 does not decide any right of the parties not has the learned Single Judge decided the matter on merits and, therefore, it cannot be treated as a judgment so as to entitle the appellant to prefer Letters Patent Appeal. Mr. Patwalia argued that the learned Single Judge has not even ordered the issue of notice of punishment and, therefore, it cannot be said that any order has been pasted by the learned Single Judge having the trappings and characteristics of a final order affecting the rights of the parties. Mr. Patwalia strenuously argued that against the order dated 21. 1. 1994 the present appellant can have no grievance because the only opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge is that prima facie action of the respondent in the contempt petition amounts to contempt The learned Deputy Advocate General argued that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge materially affects the rights of the appellant because the learned Single Judge has already expressed the opinion that the present appellant is guilty of contempt. Mr. Saron argued that even though appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, may not be maintainable, this appeal can appropriately be treated as an appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent. Mr. Saron argued that by the impugned order the learned Single Judge has decided the controversy regarding maintainability of the contempt petition and, therefore, the appellant has a right to file an appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent. He placed reliance on judgment of a Division Bench of Madras High Court in Shantha V. Pai v. Vasanth Builders, Madras 1991 Criminal Law Journal 3026; Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. The Home insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 S. C. 1719 and Shah Babu Lal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania AIR 1981 S. C. 1786. Mr. Saron also placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, C. J. of the Orisia H. C. , AIR 1974 S. C. 2255 and Bakadakanta Mishra v. Orissa High Court AIR 1976 S. G. 1206; Purshottam Dass v. B. S. Dhillon, AIR 1978 S. C. 1014; D. N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, 7 AIR 1988 S. C. C. (Criminal) 546.

(3.)ARTICLE 215 Of the Constitution of India declares that every High Court is a Court of record. Being a Court of record, every High Court is vested With all powers of such Court including the power of punishment for contempt of itself and has an inherent jurisdiction as well as right to uphold its dignity and authority. Power of the High Court under Article 215 to punish for contempt of itself is analogous to Article 129 which confers similar power On the Supreme Court Prior to the enactment of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was unequivocally recognised that the High Court has inherent power to deal with the contempt of itself summarily and to adopt its own procedure subject of course to the compliance of rules of natural justice. Entry 77 of list 1 & Entry 14 of list III of VIIth Schedule 10 the Constitution provides that contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Court can be regulated by legislation enacted by appropriate Legislature and it is in the exercise of these legislative Powers that the Parliament has enacted Act of 1971. Never the less inherent power of the Supreme Court and the High Court cannot in any manner be treated to have been abridged by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. As a matter of fact Section 22 of 1971 Act lays down that the provisions of 1971 Act shall be in addition to and in derogation of the provisions of any other law relating to Contempt of Courts This provisions of law. was enunciated by the apex Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court, A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 186. In that case, the Supreme Court held: "in any case so far as contempt of High Court itself is Concerned, has distinction from one of the subordinate Court, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, so no Act of Legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it a fresh by virtue of its own authority.