JUDGEMENT
I.A.Ansari, J. -
(1.)THE challenge, in this writ appeal, is against the judgment and order, dated 28.07.2011, passed, in WP(C) No. 5331/2009, by a learned Single Judge of this Court, who, while allowing the writ petition, set aside the order, dated 23.06.2009, passed by the Director of Education, Bodoland Territorial Council, Kokrajhar, whereby the service of the writ petitioner was terminated on, chiefly, four grounds, namely, (i) that the order of termination was not preceded by any notice to show cause against the termination of the appointment of the petitioner as an Assistant Teacher in ME School, (ii) that the order of termination had been passed after 11 (eleven) years of the appointment of the writ petitioner, (iii) that the order of termination is vague and (iv) that the petitioner's appointment, as an Assistant Teacher, had been confirmed many years back.
(2.)WE have heard Mr. D. Das, learned Senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant, and Mrs. N. Saikia, learned counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent.
Before coming to the merit of the present appeal, it is apposite to take note of the order, which stood impugned in the writ petition, whereby the service of the writ petitioner (respondent herein) had been terminated, the order having been issued, on 23.06.2009, by the Director of Education, Bodoland Territorial Council, Kokrajhar. The order, in question, reads as under:
"GOVT. OF ASSAM OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION, BTC, KOKRAJHAR ORDER Dated Kokrajhar the 23rd June/2009. No. DE/BTC/Apptt-124/09/278, In exercise of power conferred upon the Director of Education vide Secretary, BTC's No. BTC/EDN(EI)- 35/2005/1, dtd. 13-09-2005 and in pursuance of order Secretary BTC's vide letter No. BTC/EDN/TERM-514/2008/3, dtd. 6th Nov/2008, the services of Krishna Haloi, AT, Uttar Kamrup MEM (doubtful) is hereby terminated from service with immediate effect due to non-fulfilling the following terms & conditions. A. Advertisement issued by the DEEO, D.I. of Schools of Nalbari inviting application as a candidates to fill-up the posts in the schools. B. Approval of State Level Empowered Committee of the personal department of Govt. of Assam to fill-up the posts. C. The records of holding interview and preparation of score sheets by the interview Board. D. List of selected candidates indicating vacancies of the schools to fill-up the selected candidates. E. Approval of EBAC for the appointment. Sd/- R. S. Borgayary, Director of Education, Bodoland Territorial Council, Kokrajhar Memo No. DE/BTC/Apptt-124/09/278-A, Dated Kokrajhar the 23rd June/2009. Copy to: 1. The PS to the Executive Member, Education, BTC, Kokrajhar, for information. 2. The Secretary, Education, BTC, Kokrajhar, for favour of information. 3. The DEEO, Baska, Mushalpur, for information. 4.The BEEO, Baska, Mushalpur/Tamulpur/Tihu-Barama for information. 5. Sri Diganta Das, Sr. Advocate, Gauhati High Court & Standing counsel, BTC, Kokrajhar, for information. 6. The Headmaster/Head teacher, Uttar Kamrup MEM for information. 7. The person concerned. 8. Office guard file. Sd/- R. S. Borgayary, Director of Education, Bodoland Territorial Council, Kokrajhar"
From a bare reading of the order, dated 23.06.2009, which has been set aside by the learned Single Judge, what can be clearly gathered from the order, dated 23.06.2009 (whereby the writ petitioner's service was terminated), is the fact that there were four specific grounds, which were mentioned in the order of termination. These grounds were as follows:
"1. That no advertisement had been issued by the DEEO, D.I. of Schools, Nalbari, inviting applications from eligible candidates to fill up the posts in the schools. 2. That necessary approval of State Level Empowered Committee of the Personnel Department, Govt. of Assam, to fill up the posts had not been taken. 3. That there was no record available with regard to holding of interview and/or preparation of score-sheets by the interview Board. 4. No list of selected candidates, indicating vacancies of the schools, was available to appoint the selected candidates. 5.Necessary approval of EBAC for the appointment had not been obtained."
(3.)THUS, the order, dated 23.6.2009, is not a vague order inasmuch as it assigned grounds, which led to the termination of the writ petitioner's appointment. There is no doubt that the order of termination was not preceded by any notice to show cause against the proposed termination. This by itself is, however, not sufficient, under the law, to set aside an order of termination unless the writ petitioner can show that absence of notice has caused prejudice to him. The reason for insisting on a notice before termination of an employee's service is that the employee must receive an opportunity to show cause against the grounds on which his appoint is sought to be terminated. This does not, as a corollary, necessarily mean that an order of termination must be set aside, whenever it is not preceded by a notice to show cause. It is within the ambit of the power of the Court to ask the employee as to what would have been his reply, had be been served with a notice to show cause. If the reply of the employee reveals that the conclusion, reached by the employer to terminate the service of the employee, without serving any notice on the employee to show cause, would have remained the same, had the employee been served with a notice to show cause, the Court would not interfere with the order of termination, for, in such a case, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the employee concerned. The test, in such cases, always lies in determining as to whether any prejudice has been caused to an employee for not giving him any notice to show cause or for not supplying to him enquiry report, which becomes the basis of imposition of punishment. Reference, in this regard, made to the case of Union of India Vs. Bisamber Das Dogra, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 102, wherein the Supreme Court took note Umrao Singh of various decisions, including its decision in Choudhary (Dr.) Vs. State of M.P., reported in (1994) 4 SCC 328, and Syndicate Bank Vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 150, and concluded to the effect that to sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice. The relevant observations, appearing in para 12 and 13 of Bisamber Das Dogra (supra), read as under:
"12. In Umrao Singh Choudhary (Dr.) v. State of M.P., this Court held (SCC p. 331, para 4) that the principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement the law. 13. In Syndicate Bank v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, it was held: 18. ... To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice."
One may also refer to the case of Haryana Financial Corporation Vs. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, reported in (2008) 9 SCC 31, wherein the Court, referring to the case of ECIL Vs. B. Karunakar, reported in (1994) SCC Suppl (2) 391, pointed out that even failure to supply the report of the enquiry before imposition of punishment on the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void nor would, in such a case, the order of punishment become non est and ineffective and that it is for the delinquent employee to plead and also prove that non-supply of enquiry report has caused prejudice to him and that miscarriage of justice has resulted thereby and, if the employee fails to satisfy the Court on this score, the order of punishment cannot be automatically set aside.