JUDGEMENT
PER MAJMUDAR, J. -
(1.)THE petitioner who is a detenu under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti -Social Activities Ordinance, 1985 ('the Ordinance' for short) has challenged the order of his detention on diverse grounds. The order is at annexure 'C' to the petition. It is issued by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad and it reads that the authority is statisfied with respect to the person known as Dilipsing Darshansingh Bharodia (the petitioner herein), that with a view to maintenance of public order in the area of Ahmedabad city, it is necessary to make an order that the said Dilipsing be detained. The grounds of detention dated 1 -6 -1985 are also supplied to the detenu. By an amendment to this petition, which was granted by us on 4 -10 -1985, a contention is raised in para 12B that when the detenu got the knowledge from the others dated 12 -9 -85 that he has right to make the representation to State Government against the detention order, with the help of others, he had sent the representation to the State Government and the detaining authority but till today, it is not considered. Thus, on one hand, the fundamental right of the petitioner is violated by making delay in considering it. It is also illegal and unjust and continued detention of the petitioner becomes illegal. Earlier, when this petition was admitted to final hearing, the Commissioner of police who is the detaining authority had filed his affidavit -in -reply seeking to meet all the grounds raised originally in the petition. So far as the aforesaid ground 12B brought on record by amendment is concerned, Mr. M. T. Parmar, Under Secretary, Home Department has filed his affidavit -in -reply on behalf of the State of Gujarat which is the authority that had to consider the representation. In connection with aforesaid ground 12B, regarding delay in consideration of the representation, the following reply is submitted in para 3 of the affidavit -in -reply:
"With reference to the averments and allegations made in ground (12B) of the petition, I say that representation dated 21st of September, 1985 was received through the Jailor, Ahmedabad Central Prison, Ahmedabad by the Home Department on 23 -9 -1985. I say that thereafter the notes were prepared on 7th October, 1985 and alongwith the report, it was placed for consideration of the State Government. I say that after carefully considering the representation of the detenu, the same was rejected on 8 -10 -1985. During this period many other representations were also received from different detenus, wherein report was required to be prepared for the purpose of consideration of the representation by the State Government. Apart from that, many other papers were received, wherein the Government had to approve the detention orders passed by different detaining authorities under different Acts. I say that the detention matters are being handled by special 6 -Branch of the Home Department, wherein only three persons are working, one Section Officer and two Assistants. Thus, inspite of paucity of staff and heavy pressure of work, the representation of the detenu was considered carefully and was rejected on 8 -10 -1985 without any avoidable delay and as soon as possible."
(2.)MR . H. L. Patel for Miss Kachhavah for the petitioner placed in the forefront the aforesaid ground 12B for consideration alongwith other grounds. Having heard Mr. Patel for the petitioner and Mr. Panchal, learned Assistant P.P. for the respondents, we have come to the conclusion that this petition deserves to be allowed only on that ground. Hence, we have not thought it necessary to dilate on other contentions which Mr. Patel wanted to urge in support of the petition.
(3.)SO far as the question regarding expeditious disposal of the representation filed by the detenu in the light of the constitutional mandate under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution and also in the light of the statutory requirement of Section 9(1) of the Ordinance is concerned, it becomes obvious that the statutory provision itself lays down that the concerned detenu has to be communicated the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and has to be afforded earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. The same is the mandate of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution. Therefore, the short question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the time taken by the State Government in disposal of the representation of the petitioner against his detention can be said to have been satisfactorily explained on the facts of this case. Before we turn to the factual aspect of the matter in the light of the pleadings of the parties, it will be profitable to have a look at a few relevant decisions on the point to which our attention was invited by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties: Legal Matrix: The constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayanarayan v. State of W.B.,AIR 1970, SC 675, had an occasion to consider this very question. Ray, J. speaking for the Supreme Court laid down the law on the point as under:
"Broadly stated, four principles are to be followed in regard to representation, of detenu. First, the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. Secondly, the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the Advisory Board. Thirdly, there should not be any delay in the matter of consideration It is true that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the measure of time taken by the appropriate authority for consideration but it has to be remembered that the Government has to be vigilant in the governance of the citizens. A citizen's right raises a correlative duty of the State. Fourthly, the appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation before sending the case along with the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board. If the appropriate Government will release the detenu the Government will not send the matter to the Advisory Board. If however the Government will not release the detenu the Government will send the case alongwith the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board. If thereafter the Advisory Board will express an opinion in favour of release of the detenu the Government will release the detenu. If the Advisory Board will express any opinion against the release of the detenu the Government may still exercise the power to release the detenu." The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court has been consistently followed and applied to the facts of the concerned cases by subsequent benches of the Supreme Court before which such question arose for consideration. We may refer to a few of them on the point. In the case of Pushpa v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1953, D. A. Desai, J. as a vacation Judge spoke for the Supreme Court in para 14 of the report on this point as under:
"Where there are specified time -limits which could not be transgressed, an action beyond the prescribed time may be either incompetent or without jurisdiction or without the authority of law. Where a citizen is deprived of his liberty and grounds of detention are furnished to him, his representation must be examined as expeditiously as possible, but as has been said in Sukul's Case, there is no hard and fast rule as to the measure of time taken by the authority for consideration of the representation. However, a caution was administered that the Government should be vigilant in the governance of the citizens." On the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, it was, however, held that looking to the long list of documents copies of which were asked for by the detenus, the time taken for supplying the copies and then considering the representation did not appear to be unreasonable.
Out attention was then invited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner to two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in the same volume of AIR 1980. The first is in the case of Frances Coralie v. W. C. Khambra, AIR 1980, SC 849. In that case, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Supreme Court observed in para 5 of the report:
"The role of the court in cases of preventive detention it has to be one of eternal vigilance. No freedom is higher than personal freedom and no duty higher than to maintain it unimpaired." It was further observed: "Art. 22 (5) vests in the detenu the right to be provided with an opportunity to make a representation. Here the law reports tell a story and teach a lesson. It is that the principal enemy of the detenu and his right to make a representation is neither high -handedness nor mean -mindedness but the casual indifference, the mindless insensibility, the routine and the red -tape of the bureaucratic machine." It was further observed: "The time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive. The court's observations are not to be so understood. There has to be lee -way, depending on the necessities (we refrain from using the word 'circumstances') of the case. One may well imagine a case where a detenu does not make a representation before the Board makes its report making it impossible for the detaining, authority either to consider it or to forward it to the Board in time or a case where a detenu makes a re -presentation to the detaining authority so shortly before the Advisory Board takes up the reference that the detaining authority cannot consider the representation before then but may merely forward it to the Board without himself considering it. Several such situations may arise compelling departure from the time imperative. But no allowance can be made for lethargic indifference. No allowance can be made for needless procrastination. But, allowance must surely be made for necessary consultation where legal intricacies and factual ramifications are involved. The burden of explaining the necessity for the slightest departure from the time imperative is on the detaining authority."