- (1.)The five petitions question the power of the Vending Committee and the Appellate Authority constituted, initially under the directions of the Supreme Court, as noticed in Sodan Singh vs. NDMC, 1998 2 SCC 743 and Sudhir Madan vs. MCD, 2007 8 Scale 339, to regulate hawking, squatting and vending on the streets and under the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, 2004, replaced by the Policy of 2009. The petitions challenge the orders of the Appellate Authority restraining the petitioner NDMC from disturbing and/or removing the hawkers/squatters/vendors impleaded as respondents in the petitions from their respective squatting places and directing the petitioner NDMC to maintain status quo. Notices of the petitions were issued and counter affidavits have been filed by the respondents/vendors. The counsels have been heard.
(2.)It is not in dispute that the Vending Committee and the Appellate Authority were not constituted by or under a statute but owe their existence either to the judicial pronouncements or the Policy . It is also not in dispute that there is no express provision, neither in the Policy nor in the judicial pronouncements empowering the Vending Committee and/or the Appellate Authority to pass orders as under challenge in these petitions. It is in this background that it needs to be deciphered whether the Vending Committee and/or the Appellate Authority are empowered to pass orders/interim orders impugned in these petitions.
(3.)Questions as aforesaid have been arising before the Courts from time to time. The Apex Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund vs. Kartick Das, 1994 4 SCC 225was faced with the entitlement of the fora constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to grant such interim orders. Finding the Act, to have not conferred any such power to grant any interim relief or ad-interim relief and, having conferred power only to grant the final relief, it was held that the said fora could not be held to be empowered to grant interim injunction.