- (1.)Since the parties and questions arising are common to these two appeals, they are disposed of by a common judgment. They are by the State of Karnataka represented by the Land Acquisition Officer, Dharwar, and against the order passed on I.A.s.II and III, in Miscellaneous Appeals 21 and 22 of 1973 on the file of the Second Additional District Judge, Dharwar, whereby he has refused to set aside abatement and permit the legal representatives of the respondent to be brought on record.
(2.)The miscellaneous appeals in question have been preferred by the State, being aggrieved by the awards made by the Civil Judge on a reference under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It would appear that when they were pending the respondent-claimant died on 17-4-1974. The appellant-State came to know of it only on 6-6-1974 through a memo filed, by the Counsel for the deceased respondent. Thereupon the appellant made enquires and aflei verifying the fart cf death rf the respondent and ascertaining the names and addresses of his legal representatives, filed applications under rules 4 and 9 of Order 22 CPC on 17-9-1974. The learned District Judge dismissed the applications holding inter alia that the grounds urged in support of the application for setting aside abatement were vague and insufficient. Hence the appeals.
(3.)At the outset, it would be relevant to refer to certain enumerations contained in two of the decisions of the Supreme Court which have a bearing on the question on hand. In Union of India v. Ram Charan, AIR. 1964 SC. 215, it is enounced thus :
"There is no question of construing the expression 'sufficient cause'' liberally either because the party in default is the Govt or because the question arises in connection with the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent. The provisions of the Code are with a view to advance the cause of justice. Of course, the Court, in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for rot applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, rped not be over-strict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the abatement is not set aside, the appellant is deprived of his proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance. This, however, does not mean that the Court should readily accept whatever the arppllant alleges to explain away his default. It has to scrutinize it and would be fully justified in considering the merits of the evidence led to establishj the cause for the appellant's default in applying within time for the impieading of the legal representatives of the decease or for setting aside the abatement. It is true that it is no duty of the appellant to make regular enquiries from time to time about the health or existance of the respondent, but it does not mean that the mere fact of the appellant's coming to know of the respondent's death belatedly will, by itself, justify his application for setting aside the abatement. That is not the law..."
(emphasis supplied) And . .
"The limitation for an application to set aside abatement of a suit does not start on the death of the deceased respondent. Art.171 (present Art.121), First Schedule to the Limitation Act provides that. It does not provide the limitation to start from the date of the appellant's knowledge thereof......"