VENKATACHALIAH, K.JAYACHANDRA REDDY, AGRAWAL, J. - (1.)THE writ petitions, transfer petitions, civil appeals, special leave petitions, and other connected matters raising common questions as to the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, insofar as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of India, were heard together. Some of these matters involve investigation and determination of factual controversies and of the extent of applicability to them of the conclusions reached on the various constitutional issues. That exercise shall have to be undertaken in the individual cases separately
(2.)THE present judgment is pronounced in the Transfer Petition No. 40 of 1991 seeking the transfer of the writ petition, Rule NO. 2421 of 1990 on the file of the High Court of Guwahati to this Court
The transfer petition is allowed and the aforesaid writ petition is withdrawn to this Court for the purpose of deciding the constitutional issues and of declaring the law of the matter

(3.)FOR the reasons to be set out in the detailed judgment to follow, the following are the operative conclusions in the majority opinion on the various constitutional issues
[A] That having regard to the background and evolution of the principles underlying the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, insofar as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of India, the provisions of paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution in terms and in effect bring about a change in the operation and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the amendment would require to be ratified in accordance with the proviso to sub-article (2) of Article 368 to the Constitution of India[B] That there is nothing in the said proviso to Article 368(2) which detracts from the severability of a provision on account of the inclusion of which the Bill containing the amendment requires ratification from the rest of the provisions of such Bill which do not attract and require such ratification. Having regard to the mandatory language of Article 368(2) that "thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended" the operation of the proviso should not be extended to constitutional amendments in a Bill which can stand by themselves without such ratification [C] That, accordingly, the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, insofar as it seeks to introduce the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution of India, to the extent or its provisions which are amenable to the legal sovereign of the amending process of the Union Parliament cannot be overborne by the proviso which cannot operate in that area. There is no justification for the view that even the rest of the provisions of the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985, excluding paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule become constitutionally infirm by reason alone of the fact that one of its severable provisions which attracted and required ratification under the proviso to Article 368 (2) was not so ratified [D] That paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule contains a provision which is independent of, and stands apart from, the main provisions of the Tenth Schedule which are intended to provide a remedy for the evil of unprincipled and unethical political defections and, therefore, is a severable part. The remaining provisions of the Tenth Schedule can and do stand independently of paragraph 7 and are complete in themselves, workable and are not truncated by the excision of paragraph 7 [E] That the paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is valid. Its provisions do not suffer from the vice of subverting democratic rights of elected Members of Parliament and the legislatures of the States. It does not violate their freedom of speech, freedom of vote and conscience as contended The provisions of paragraph 2 do not violate any rights or under Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution The provision are salutary and are intended to strengthen the fabric of Indian parliamentary democracy by curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections [F] The contention that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, even with the exclusion of paragraph 7, violate the basic structure of the Constitution in that they affect the democratic rights of elected members and, therefore, of the principles of parliamentary democracy is unsound and is rejected [G] The Speakers/Chairmen while exercising powers and discharging functions under the Tenth Schedule act as Tribunal adjudicating rights and obligations under the Tenth Schedule and their decisions in that capacity are amenable to judicial review However, having regard to the Constitutional Scheme in the Tenth Schedule, judicial review should not cover any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speakers/Chairmen. Having regard to the constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, no quia timet actions are permissible, the only exception for any interlocutory interference being cases of interlocutory disqualifications or suspensions which may have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequence [H] That paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule, to the extent it seeks to impart finality of the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen is valid. But the concept of statutory finality embodied in paragraph 6(1) does not detract from or abrogate judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution insofar as infirmities based on violations of constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of Natural Justice and perversity, are concerned[I] That the deeming provision in paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts an immunity analogous to that in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) of the Constitution as understood and explained in Keshav Singh case ( 1965 (1) SCR 413 : 1965 AIR(SC) 745) to protect the validity of proceedings from mere irregularities of procedure. The deeming provision, having regard to the words "be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament" or "proceedings in the legislature of a State" confines confines the scope of the fiction accordingly [J] That contention that the investiture of adjudicatory functions in the Speakers/Chairmen would by itself vitiate the provision on the ground of likelihood of political bias is unsound and is rejected. The Speakers/Chairmen hold a pivotal position in the scheme of parliamentary democracy and are guardians of the rights and privileges of the House. They are expected to and do take far reaching decisions in the functioning of parliamentary democracy. Vestiture of power to adjudicate questions under the Tenth Schedule in such constitutional functionaries should not be considered exceptionable [K] In the view we take of the validity of paragraph 7 it is unnecessary to pronounce on the contention that judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution and paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule violates such basic structure