JAGANMOHAN REDDY,J. - (1.)This is an application for a writ of prohibition directed against, the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Nellore, restraining him from suspending the petitioners permit pursuant to an order made by him dated 29-11-1955. The petitioner is a bus operator and his bus ADN. 255 was stopped and checked on the route.on 14-7-1955 at 7-10 p.m. at mile 103/4 on the G.N.T. road. It was found to be running 2 hours late. Explanation was called for from the operator who gave the reason for the late running of the bus as being due to the level crossing at Venkatachalasatram. This explanation was found to be unsatisfactory and not true and consequently the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, taking into consideration the gravity of the offence and the history sheet of the operator, suspended the bus ADN 255 on the route Edagali-Nellore for one week from a date which would be intimated while making arrangements for substitute service. Thereafter the Secretary. Regional Transport Authority passed an order on 9-7-1956 directing the suspension to take effect from 20-7-1956. It is this order that the petitioner seeks in prevent by the issue of a writ of prohibition. While this writ petition was pending, a Full Bench of this High Court in Gudla Satyanarayana v. The State, 1957 ALT 746 held by a majority that the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority had no power to suspend any permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority and the delegation made to him under the Rules is ultra vires the powers if of the Act. Having regard to this decision, not only the order of the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority dated 29-11-35 but also the subsequent order dated 9-7-1956 would be without jurisdiction. It is argued by the learned advocate for the Government that this writ petition is barred by limitation in as much as it had been presented beyond six months from the date when the order was made on, 29-11-1955. He further contends that the order of 9-7-1956 is an administrative order passed only in compliance with the previous orders and consequently the writ of prohibition will not lie against administrative orders. It is true that a Bench of this Court in Eluru, Venkata Subbarao v. D.T.S. (Traffic) Vijayawada, Southern Railway, 1957 ALT 785 following, the English Supreme Court Rules and the practise prevailing there, held that six months-period would be a reasonable period for limitation for writ petitions unless there are reasons for the delay. The decision of the Bench related to a writ oil certiorari, and Or. 64 R. 7 R.S.C, to which a reference was made related to the time fixed for filing a writ of certiorari. Even there it was held that the court had power to extend the time and excuse the delay in filing a writ of certiorari. In the circumstances it was observed "there is no reason why this High Court should follow a different rule." In England, however, in cases of writ of prohibition, it has been held that as long as there is some thing to be acted upon, the writ of prohibition runs and that there is no question of limitation or laches. These obvious reason for this exception is that the threatened action being challenged on the ground of want of jurisdiction or illegality can be prohibited if it can be shown that the order is prima facie illegal and unwarranted and there is still something upon which the order can act. In Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd. v. Singapore Improvement Trust, 1937 (3) All. Eng. L.R. 324 where it was sought to be argued that the respondent trust was functus officio because it had made a declaration and submitted it to the Governor-in-Council for sanction, that since the Governor-in-Council was not a party to the proceedings, there can be no claim founded on Certiorari and that there was nothing left to be done by the Board as a quasi-judicial body, nothing on which a writ of prohibition could operate and that the application not having been made before the declaration was submitted to the Governor in Council, is too late, Lord lam delivering the judgment of the Bench, observed at page 333 :
"It is not in dispute that the fact that the declaration has been submitted to the Governor in Council is in itself no reason against the issue of the writ. A proceeding is none the less a judicial proceeding subject to prohibition or certiorari because it is subject to confirmation or approval by some other authority On the other hand, there must remain something to which prohibition can apply, some act which the respondent trust, if not prohibited, may do in excess of its jurisdiction, including any act, not merely, ministerial, which may be done by it in carrying into effect any quasi-judicial order which it has wrongly made".

(2.)Their Lordships adopted the statement of Wright, J. in Re London Scottish Permanent Building Society, (1893) 63 L.J.Q.B. 112 , that an application for prohibition is never too late as long as there is something left for it to operate upon. This statement of Wright, J., was expressly approved in Rex v. North Ex. P. Qakey, 1927 (1) K.B. 491 by Scrutton, L.J. with the following observations at page 503:
" When the sentence is un-executed a statement of intention to execute it may be followed by a writ of prohibition, however long a time may have elapsed since the original sentence was pronounced".

(3.)In my view, the order of 9-7-1950 is seeking to suspend the applicant's permit and consequently is an illegal order as it is passed by a person not having jurisdiction to pass it. Further it purports to act under an order passed by the same officer previously without jurisdiction.