PUNNY RAM Vs. CHIRANJI LAL GUPTA
LAWS(DLH)-1982-5-24
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Decided on May 28,1982

PUNNY RAM Appellant
VERSUS
CHIRANJI LAL GUPTA Respondents


Referred Judgements :-

SMT. PARVATI DEVI V. TIBBIA COLLEGE BOARD AND ANOTHER [REFERRED]
C R ABROL VS. ADMINISTRATOR UNDER THE SLUM AREAS [REFERRED 4. FATIMA AND ORS. V. SHRI M.K.RAI AND ANOTHER C.W. 1268 OF 1970DECIDED ON 30/7/1971.]
KISHAN LAL MAHADEO PERSHAD VS. I K SHARMA [REFERRED]
VISHENDAS VS. ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNION TERRITORY OF DELHI [REFERRED]



Cited Judgements :-

KISHAN LAL VS. DCM LIMITED [LAWS(DLH)-1999-11-11] [REFERRED]
ORISSA INDUSTRIES LIMITED VS. HARDAYAL AND SONS HUF [LAWS(DLH)-2003-1-54] [REFERRED]
JOGINDER SINGH VS. K C JOHOREY [LAWS(DLH)-1991-5-76] [REFERRED]
VISHAL KIRTI VS. VIPIN KUMAR JAIN [LAWS(DLH)-2010-12-149] [REFERRED TO]
VARADAN VS. M SUBBULAKSHMI AMMAL [LAWS(MAD)-1990-2-49] [REFERRED TO]
GIRI RAJ VS. DEEPAK GUPTA [LAWS(DLH)-2013-9-532] [REFERRED TO]
TULSI DASS AHUJA VS. CHATTAR SINGH [LAWS(DLH)-2017-10-67] [REFERRED TO]
SATENDER JAIN VS. SATYA NARAIN SANJIV GUPTA HUF [LAWS(DLH)-2021-9-306] [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

Prakash Narain, C.J. - (1.)These three appels have been placed before us on a refernce by a Division Bench of this Court. Some of the points in the three appeals are different but it is not necessary to deal with each one of them as the main point is common that alone turns the fate of these appeals.
(2.)The common point of law which arises for determination in these cases is with regard to the interpretation of sub-section (4) of section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as the Act. This provision reads as under :-
"(4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under sub-section (3), the Competent Authority shall take into account the following factors, namely:- (a) Whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted ; (b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas ; (c) such other factors, if any, as may be prescribad."
The contention on behalf of the appellants is that keeping in view the observations of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Persad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi and others, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1602, clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of section 19 of the Act have to be read cumulatively and permission to execute and order or decree of eviction against a tenant or to institute eviction proceedings against a tenant can only be granted if findings of the competent authority on both clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(4) of Act are against the contention of the tenant. In other words, the competent authority has to first determine whether the tenant, if evicted, can within his means get alternative accomodation of the type which would not result in creating another slum and then determine whether the eviction would be in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas. Alternatively, the appellants submit, even if the finding of the competent authority is that the tenant, if evicted, can get accommodation within his means of a type which will not create slums, the tenant cannot be evicted unless he is given reasonable alternative accommodation which will not be slum-type of accommodation. As a further alternative it is submitted that for a tenant who does not have the means to get alternative accommodation of the type which may be described as not being a slum, he can be evicted or allowed to be evicted only if alternate decent accommodation is made available to him. The appellants contend that several decision of this court in which it has been held that clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act have to be considered by the competent authority disjunctively need to be reconsidered in view of the dicta of the Supreme Court in Jyoti Preshad's case (supra).
(3.)As opposed to the above contentions the respondents submit that clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act have to be read disjunctively. If the finding of the competent authority is that the tenant has adequate means to acquire alternative accommodation, permission to evict should be 344 granted without any further consideration of the postulates of clause (b). It is further submitted that if the postulates of Sub-clause (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act are satisfied) namely, on the facts and circumstances of the case the competent authority comes .to the conclusion that eviction of the tenant is necessary in the interest of improvement and clearance of slum areas then the fact that the tenant does not have means to acquire alternative accommodation is irrelevant. In putting forth this submission the respondents counter the contention on behalf of the appellants that improvement and clearance of the slum areas contemplated by clause (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act has to be improvement and clearance of the slum areas as contemplated by Chapters III and IV of the Act. The contention is that the scheme for the improvement and clearance of slum areas by the State or any authority under the State alone should not and cannot be regarded as a condition precedent for invoking clause (b) of Section 19(4) of the Act as this activity can even be undertaken by an owner or a group of owners of the property. The Preamble of the Acts reads as under :- "An Act to provide for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in certain Union Territories and for the protection of tenants in such areas from eviction." As is apparent from a reading of the Preamble the legislative intent of a social legislation of the type with which we are concerned is to attain an objective and in the intervening period to provide protection to, what may be called, the weaker section of the society. A careful study of the substantive provisions of the Act would bring out this objective even better and we shall be dealing with the same. Suffice it to say at this stage that the objective of this legislation is to eradicate the evil of slums by improving and clearing them either singly or collectively. In the transitional period, till that is done, the weaker section of the society is to be protected. This aspect is brought out with great force in Jyoti Pershad's case (Supra). For reasons which it is almost impossible to enumerate or even comprehend, the social objective sought to be realised by the Act enacted . by the Parliament way back in 1956 has not yet been realised to any significant event. Indeed Section 19 of the Act was amended by Parliament by the amending Act 43 of 1964, realising after 8 years that the Act had been in force, that the objective outlined by the Preamble needed to be further clarified or elaborated by substituting Section 19 as it existed earlier with section as contained in Section 10 of Act 43 of 1964. To day therefore, we will have to read not only the Preamble but the entire Act in the light of Section l9 as amended to get & clear picture of the legislative intent. Section 19 as it stood prior to the amendment of 1964 reads as under :- "19(1) Notwithstanding any thing contained in any other law for the time being in forced) on person who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area shall be entitld to execute such decree or order except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority. (2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-section (1) shall make an application in writing to the Competent Authority in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. 345 (3) On receipt of such application, the Competent Authority, after giving an opportunity to the tenant of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the cases as it deems fit, shall by order in writing either grant such permission or refuse to grant such permission. (4) Where the Competent Authority refuses to grant the permission, he shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant." The amendment to Section 19 reads as under :- "19(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other Law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the Competent Authority :- a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areal (Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964, any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area: or b) Where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order. (2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-Section (1) shall make an application in writing to the Competent Authority in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. (3) On receipt of such application, the Competent Authority, after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard -and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, shall by order in writing, either grant or refuse to grant such permission. (4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under sub-section (3), the Competent Authority shall take into account the following factors nemely :- (a) Whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted ; (b) Whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas ; (c) Such other factors, if any, may be prescribed. (5) Whether the Competent Authority refuses to grant the permission, it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant Why we are reading the unamend Section 19 because also in Jyoti Pershad's case, which was decided in 1961, their Lordships of the Supreme Court who were with the unamended Section 19, and in construing 346 it observed that as guideline for the enquiry postulated by the Competent authority was to be found in the Preamble, the Section could not be regarded as giving arbitrary powers. Mr. Narula, appearing for the appellants, however, submits that the amendment of Section 19 would still not make any difference as the law declared in Jyoti Pershad's case is binding on courts and the legislative intent on a correct reading of the Preamble even with the amended Section 19 would be laid down in Jyoti Perhad's case.


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