PANWAR, J. - (1.)THIS revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has been filed against the judgment and order dated 25. 10. 2002 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/st) Court, Merta, in Sessions Case No. 13/2002, by which the accused-respondents No. 2 to 4 have been acquitted of the offence under Section 447 and 323/34, IPC and Section 3 (1) (x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, "the Act" ).
(2.)I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor for the State. I have also gone through the impugned judgment and order as well as the certified copies of the record.
The facts and circumstance giving rise to this case, in nut shell, are that on 22. 8. 2000, an FIR was lodged by complainant- petitioner Roopa Ram with the Police Station, Thavla with the allegation that on that day, at about 2:00 p. m. , when the was watching his Gawar crop, some five-six buffalows came to his filed and started grazing in the filed, he tried to save and protect his field and crop and by that time, Mahipal Singh, Shyam Singh, Chandan Singh and Mangu came there armed with Kassi and Lathis and started beating him and forcibly snatched Rs. 4500/- from him and started abusing him to lower down his prestige and caste. On this, the police registered a case under Sections 143, 323 and 379, IPC and Section 3 (1) (X of the Act. The investigation ensued and after conclusion thereof, a challan was filed in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Degana and ultimately the case was committed to the trial Court. The trial Court framed charges against the accused for the offences under Section 447 and 323/34, IPC and Section 3 (1) (X) of the Act and after trial, acquitted the accused of the aforesaid offences. Hence this revision petition.

It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned trial court has erred in law as well as on facts in acquitting the accused of the offences aforesaid. It was further contended that the trial court erred in giving much emphasis on the Tehrir Ex. P. 4 issued by the S. H. O. and ignored the injury report issued by Medical Officer Dr. Radhey Shyam Khatod. It was also contended that the presence of PW 3 Pema Ram and PW 4 Anda Ram at the scene of the occurrence was most natural but the same have been disbelieved only on the pretext that they are the close relatives of the petitioner and as such they are interested witnesses in subserving the cause of the petitioner; and the minor contradiction in the statement of the witnesses shows that natural conduct of the witnesses and the same cannot be taken note of for recording to acquittal.

In Bansi Lal & Ors. vs. Laxman Singh (1), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- " The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside the order of acquittal and directing a retrial of the accused. . . . . . The dominant jurisdiction of the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court is the view it took of the evidence of the two eye witnesses. Having carefully gone through the records of the case we are satisfied that it was a possible view and it cannot be charecterised as illegal or perverse. It may well be that the learned Single Judge of the High Court was not inclined to agree with he said view on the basis of his independent scrutiny and appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case but that would not furnish any jurisdiction for interference in revision with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Even in an appeal the appellate Court would not have been justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope. We accordingly hold that the High Court has clearly transgressed the limits of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 (4) of Cr. P. C. in setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the Additional sessions Judge and directing a retrial of the case. "

In Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Sarju Singh (3), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- " In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned Judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them. "

(3.)IN Khetra Basis Samal & Anr. vs. The State of Orissa etc. (3), placing reliance on its earlier judgment in D. Stephens vs. Nosibolla (4), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- " The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complaint against an order of acquittal, against which the Government has a right of appeal under Section 417. It would be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record. "
In Kaptan Singh & Ors. vs. State of M. P. & Anr. (5), The Apex Court held that the revisional power of High Court, chile sitting in judgment over an order of acquittal, should not be exercised unless there exists a manifest illegality or there is grave miscarriage of justice.

In Harihar Chakravarty vs. The State of West Bengal (6), the Supreme Court held that revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in not to be lightly exercised when it is invoked by a private complainant.