Desai, C.J. - (1.)This and the associated petitions for certiorari have been referred to a larger Bench by our brother Nigam on account of their raising the question whether Narottam Saran v. State of U. P., AIR 1954 All 232 was correctly decided or not. The petitioners in ,all these petitions are tenants of accommodations governed by the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act and owned by opposite party No. 3 of each petition. Under Section 3 (i) no suit, can without the permission of the District Magistrate, he filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation (except on one or more of certain grounds, none of which exists in these cases). All the accommodations are situated in Lucknow city and the landlords applied to the District Magistrate, Luck-now for permission to eject the petitioners. The District Magistrate permitted the landlords in this petition and in petitions Nos. 304 and 306 and refused permission in petition No. 303. Section 3 (2), (3) and (4) lays down that when a District Magistrate grants or refuses to grant permission on a landlord's application the party aggrieved may within a certain time apply to the Commissioner to revise the order, that the Commissioner "shall hear the application ......... within six weeks ......... and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him, alter or reverse his order, or make such other order as may be just and proper" and that "this order would be final subject to any order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F." The petitioners in this petition and petitions Nos. 304 and 306 and the landlord in petition No. 303 applied to the Commissioner to revise the District Magistrate's orders under Section 3(2) and the Commissioner cancelled the permission already granted by the District Magistrate or refused to revise the District Magistrate's orders refusing permission. In other words, the landlords in .all the cases remained without permission. Section 7-F is to the effect that "the State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission ............ and make such order as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice". The landlords applied to the State Government to exercise this power. The applications are long applications containing detailed facts. They were entertained by the State Government and on behalf of it, the Area Rationing Officer issued notices to the petitioners, who were cited as opposite parties in the applications, calling upon them "to file their written statements to the enclosed petitions, ............ within four days of the receipt of the letter for onward transmission to the Government." The petitioners in all the cases filed written statements dealing with all the contentions put forth by the landlords in their applications to the State-Government. None of the petitioners in his written statement asked for an opportunity to be heard orally by the State Government before passing orders on the landlord's application apparently each petitioner was satisfied with the opportunity given to him to file a written statement in reply to the landlord's application. After considering the landlords' applications and the petitioners' written statements the State Government in all the cases set aside the orders passed by the Commissioner and permitted the landlords to file suits for eviction of the petitioners. It was recited in the orders that the contention of the parties had been considered, that other matters were . taken into consideration, that justice demanded that the landlords be allowed to occupy the accommodations themselves and that consequently permission was granted to them under Section 3 of the Act to file ejectment suits, against the petitioners. These orders were passed in three cases on 2-4-1962 and 23-4-1962 and in the fourth case (petition Ho. 303) on 24-4-1962. The petitioners applied to the State Government for review of its orders and the State Government rejected their applications on or about 3-8-1962. Thereupon on 27-8-1962 these petitions were filed for certiorari for the quashing of the State Government's orders passed under Section 7-F and the orders passed by it refusing to review them. The ground on which the orders passed under Section 7-F were challenged was that the State Government acted quasi-judicially and passed the orders without giving to the -petitioners a reasonable opportunity of presenting their cases and of being heard. The orders refusing to review Section 7-F orders were challenged on the grounds that the applications for review were summarily dismissed without the petitioners being heard.
(2.)An order passed by a District Magistrate granting or refusing to grant permission is undisputedly an administrative order. The scope of Section 3 (i) has been explained at length by me in Parmeshwar Dayal v. Addl. Commr. Lucknow, 1963 AH LJ 296 : (AIR 1964 All 7) and Dwarka Nath Munshi v. Gayatri Devi, 1961 All LJ 353. When a District Magistrate grants permission Jje only grants permission for the filing of a suit for the tenant's eviction and does not decide any question of rights of the parties. Whether the parties are landlord or tenant and whether the landlord has a right to eject the tenant or the tenant is under a liability to be ejected will be decided in the suit brought with the permission. The District Magistrate does not decide these questions at all when he grants permission; evidently his permitting a suit in which these questions would be agitated and decided cannot itself amount to deciding them. In deciding whether permission should be granted or not he is not at all concerned with these questions and he has no jurisdiction-to decide them. Permission is required only for the filing of a suit for eviction, and not for determining the tenancy. A suit for eviction can be filed only after the tenancy has been terminated either by a notice to quit or by the happening of a certain event and Section 3 does not prohibit or postpone the termination of the tenancy by the landlord. Before this Act was enacted a landlord could sue for eviction of his tenant at his sweet will (within the period of limitation) after the tenancy was terminated and Section 3 (i) retricts that right only to this extent that he must obtain the District Magistrate's permission to file a suit to evict the tenant. Section 3 does not lay down in what circumstances the District Magistrate should grant permission or in what circumstances he should refuse permission or what matters he should, or may, or should not, or may not, take into consideration. He can grant permission on any ground that appeals to him or refuse permission on any ground that appeals to him and the legislature has not attempted to fetter his discretion. He may grant permission on the ground that the landlord wants the accommodation for own occupation or that there is not dearth of accommodation and the tenant can very well be asked to seek another or that the tenant has made himself a nuisance or that he habitually delays paying rent to him. He may refuse permission on the ground that he is unreasonably annoyed with the tenant or that there is such a shortage of accommodation that it would be very hard on the tenant to be asked to go and find another accommodation^, or that the tenant has established a business in the accommodation and would lose the goodwill if he is asked to shift himself to another accommodation. There are so many matters which might be taken into consideration that they could not be exhaustively mentioned and the legislature had to leave the matter at the discretion of the District Magistrate without fettering it in any manner. Neither has a landlord been given a right to get permission nor has a tenant been given a right to prevent permission being granted and, therefore, no judicial consideration is involved in the District Magistrate's deciding the question; it is to be decided on the basis of the administrative policy. So it has been settled by decisions of this Court that granting or refusing to grant permission is an administrative order.
(3.)When Section 3 (i) does not lay., down in what circumstances an order granting or refusing to grant permission is correct or proper or legal, it is not understood why in Sub-section (3) the Commissioner has been given power to revise the District Magistrate's order on the ground that it is not correct or legal or proper. Really "if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order ........." would apply more when the order is one refusing permission than when it is one granting permission. The only circumstance in which an order granting permission can be said to be illegal is when the premises are not an accommodation or the District Magistrate is not the District Magistrate having jurisdiction over the place where the accommodation is situated but in either of these cases it is quite unnecessary for the tenant to seek relief against the order from the Commissioner under Sub-section (3) because if the premises are not an accommodation he is liable to be sued for eviction without any permission and if a wrong District Magistrate has granted permission the civil court itself will not accept it. Hardly any ground which appeals to a District Magistrate and on the basis of which be grant permission would be found by the Commissioner to be improper. If the ground does not exist it may be said that the order is not correct within the meaning of sub-section (3). All these cases are much smaller in number than those in which the District Magistrate refuses to grant permission by an order which is not correct or not legal or note proper. He may without jurisdiction go into the question whether the parties are landlord and tenant and refuse permission on the ground that they are not or he may refuse permission on the ground that the premises are not an accommodation. He may refuse permission on wrong facts and his order may be said to be incorrect. Or he may refuse permission on unjustifiable grounds and without considering the rights of the parties under the common law which have not been interfered with by the Act. Practically, therefore, there is hardly any scope for a Commissioner's interfering with a permission granted by a District Magistrate except on administrative grounds. The nature of a Commissioner's order Is not at all different from that of the District Magistrate's order and merely because a Commissioner is required to be satisfied about the incorrectness or illegality or impropriety of the District Magistrate'* order it cannot be said that he acts' quasi-judicially and not administratively. He performs the same jurisdiction and in exactly the same way as the District Magistrate; the legislature used the words "if he is not satisfied ...... by the District Magistrate" simply to prevent his Interfering with the District Magistrate's order at his sweet will or on any or no ground. The restriction on his power to revise a District Magistrate's order does not altar the nature of his jurisdiction and convert it into quasi-judicial jurisdiction.