- (1.)The captioned Civil Revision Application, is against the judgment and order dtd. 19/2/2013 passed by the learned 8 th Additional District Judge, Rajkot in Civil Misc. Application no.84 of 2011 whereby, the learned Judge, has condoned the delay of 3382 days occurred in filing the appeal, challenging the judgment dtd. 17/5/2001 passed in Civil Misc. Application no.44 of 1999, rejecting the request for restitution of the possession.
(2.)The facts in brief are as follows:-
2.1 Sukhlalbhai Lajibhai Vadgama, was owner of a building situated near Pattani Hospital. Regular Civil Suit no.204 of 1980 was filed against one Chetankumar Mehta and respondent - Natvarlal Mavjibhai seeking recovery of the suit property on the ground that the respondent is trespasser and has no right, title or interest over it. The suit, was partly decreed; however, the possession was not granted.

2.2 Shri Sukhlalbhai Vadgama, sold the property to Rameshbhai N. Rathod and Kantibhai Narshibhai Rathod, i.e. petitioner no.1 vide registered sale deed dtd. 4/10/1990. Suit being Small Suit no.128 of 1993 was filed before the Small Causes Court against Chetankumar Mehta and the respondent for recovery and possession and arrears of rent. Vide judgment dtd. 2/9/1996, the suit was decreed and the defendants including the respondent were directed to handover the possession to the plaintiff by 30/9/1996. Apropos the Execution Petition no.27 of 1996, the possession of the suit property was handed over on 15/3/1997. After getting the possession of the suit property, Kantibhai Narshibhai Rathod - petitioner no.1, has let the suit premises to Chandulal Hirabhai Siddhpura - petitioner no.2 on 17/3/1997 and since then, the petitioner no.2 is in occupation and possession of the suit property.

2.3 The respondent filed Regular Civil Appeal under the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ' Rent Act '), challenging the judgment dtd. 2/9/1996 passed in Small Suit no.128 of 1993. Appeal, came to be partly allowed vide judgment dtd. 15/9/1998, which was subject matter of challenge before this Court by way of Civil Revision Application no.1503 of 1998.

2.4 On 17/6/1999, the respondent, filed a Civil Misc. Application no.44 of 1999 before the Small Causes Court, Rajkot under the provisions of Sec. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the 'the Code') for restitution of possession which came to be rejected vide order dtd. 17/5/2001. Simultaneously, a suit being Small Suit no.225 of 1999 was filed by the petitioner no.2 before the Small Causes Court, seeking declaration and permanent injunction against the petitioner no.1 together with application Exh.5, which came to be allowed vide order dtd. 30/5/2000 whereby, the injunction granted vide order dtd. 29/12/1999, was confirmed.

2.5 It is thereafter, that the petitioner no.2 purchased the suit property vide registered sale deed dtd. 24/2/2003 and subsequently, on 2/10/2006, the suit came to be withdrawn against the petitioner no.1. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioner no.2, is in peaceful possession of the suit property since 17/3/1997.

2.6 As aforesaid, Civil Misc. Application no.44 of 1999 came to be rejected vide judgment dtd. 17/5/2001. Almost after a period of 10 years, the respondent, had filed Civil Misc. Application no.84 of 2011 before the 8th Additional District Judge, Rajkot challenging the judgment and order dtd. 17/5/2001 together with application seeking condonation of delay of 3382 days. The learned Judge, vide order dtd. 19/2/2013, allowed the application and condoned the delay subject to payment of costs of Rs.5,000.00, i.e. Rs.2,500.00 each to the petitioner nos.1 and 2 respectively. Being aggrieved, the captioned Civil Revision Application by the petitioners.

(3.)Mr Mrugen K. Purohit, learned advocate for the petitioners, while arguing along the lines of the revision application submitted that various proceedings were initiated and decided amongst the parties. So far as the respondent is concerned, the suit was filed being Regular Civil Suit no.204 of 1980, which was partly decreed; however, the possession was not granted to the original owner. Thereafter, the property came to be sold in favour of the petitioner no.1 vide registered sale deed who, preferred a suit which came to be decreed on 2/9/1996 with a direction to the defendants to handover the possession and in the execution proceedings, that the possession was handed over somewhere in the month of March, 1997. Regular Civil Appeal was filed which came to be allowed which was a subject matter of challenge before this Court by way of Civil Revision Application. Subsequent thereto, the respondent had filed Civil Misc. Application for restitution of the possession, which came to be rejected vide order dtd. 17/5/2001. In the interregnum, another suit was filed being Small Suit no.225 of 1999 seeking declaration and permanent injunction together with application, Exh.5 which came to be allowed. It is thereafter, that the petitioner no.2, had purchased the property vide registered sale deed in the month of February, 2003 and the suit filed, came to be withdrawn.
3.1 It is submitted that the restitution application came to be rejected which order was not challenged for almost 10 years and after 10 years that Civil Misc. Application no.84 of 2011 was filed together with application seeking condonation of delay of 3382 days, which came to be allowed.

3.2 While referring to the impugned judgment, it is submitted that the learned Judge took note of the steps taken for certified copy somewhere in the month of December, 2010 and delivery whereof, in the month of January, 2011. The learned Judge, was of the opinion that the petitioner came to know about the judgment only on 29/12/2010 and as per the provisions of the Limitation Act, that the appeal has been preferred within a period of 30 days; however, considering sufficient and reasonable reasons, there occurred a delay of further 3382 days. It is submitted that the learned Judge, took note of the proceedings, namely, the suits filed by the parties and the execution petition, so also the revision application before this Court and after considering the judgments of the Apex Court, it condoned the delay. The learned Judge, condoned the delay on the ground that an opportunity should be given to the appellant, that is the respondent and the matter to be heard and decided on merits, such approach adopted by the learned Judge is erroneous considering that no sufficient cause much less any cause was offered by the respondent in support of the delay.

3.3 It is submitted that the respondent waking up from the slumber after almost 10 years, without any explanation to be offered, has simply stated that he came to know about the judgment only in the month of December, 2010 and immediately, that the steps have been taken. It is submitted that such an explanation, cannot be construed to be sufficient explanation for the purpose of the provisions contained in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as, there has to be sufficient explanation offered and in absence of any sufficient explanation, the learned Judge, ought not to have condoned the delay.

3.4 Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi reported in 2021 SCC OnLine 1260. The Apex Court, while referring to various judgments, namely, (i) Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., reported in (1962) 2 SCR 762; (ii) P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala reported in (1997) 7 SCC 556; (iii) Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448; and Basawaraj vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, did not condone the delay as, the Apex Court, was of the opinion that there is no explanation, much less a sufficient or a satisfactory explanation offered by the respondents therein.

3.5 Further reliance is placed on the judgment in the case of Basawaraj vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra). It is submitted that the Apex Court, while considering the expression 'sufficient cause' had held and observed that sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It has also been held and observed that the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. It is submitted that reference was also made to judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Arjun Singh vs. Mohindra Kumar reported in AIR 1964 SC 993 wherein, while explaining the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause", it has been observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. The Apex Court, further observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be given an liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.

3.6 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat through Deputy Secretary vs. Kasiben Ratanjibhai Gamit reported in 2021 (3) GLR 1987. It is submitted that in case before the Division Bench of this Court, there was a delay of 1569 days, i.e. nearly 5 years on the part of the State Government. Considering the judgments, including the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Office of the Chief Post Master General vs. Living Media India Limited reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 and Basawaraj vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra), the Hon'ble Court, held that sufficient cause should be given liberal interpretation to ensure that the substantial justice is done, but only so long as the negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide cannot be infused. With this, the delay was not condoned and the appeal came to be dismissed.

3.7 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of Samusunisha Begaum w/ o. Dr. Nasarullahkhan Dhaniani vs. Vishnukumar Ambelal Patel reported in 2012 (2) GLH 725. It is submitted that the issue before this Court, was of the filing of the affidavit by the advocate trying to explain the circumstance under which delay has occurred. This Court, did not condone the delay observing that the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the Court initiated at his instance and the litigant, cannot be permitted to throw entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him any time and seek relief. It is submitted that therefore, the common thread running through all the judgments, is that if the negligence or inaction, is attributed to the petitioner and if the sufficient cause is not offered, the delay, should not be condoned.

3.8 It is submitted that a bare perusal of the application filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay, suggests that it is mere narration of the fact and the only explanation offered, is in one line and that too in paragraph 3 that the respondent was not aware about the judgment dtd. 17/5/2001. Paragraph 4 of the application, indicates that when the respondent went to the learned advocate that it came to his notice that the application, has been rejected and thereafter, that the certified copy, was applied for and was made available and immediately thereafter, that the Civil Misc. Application has been filed challenging the order dtd. 17/5/2001. It is therefore, submitted that in the application, except last line in paragraph 3, there is not a whisper as to why the respondent, had not taken any steps for challenging the judgment dtd. 17/5/2001, for almost ten years.

3.9 It is further submitted that the respondent, was dispossessed in the year 1997, during the execution proceedings and it is thereafter, that an application was filed under Sec. 144 of the Code seeking restitution. It is submitted that it is difficult to believe that the person, who is dispossessed, will not take any action for 10 years. Furthermore, in the application, there is no explanation, no account of any dates mentioned and delay, is explained in a cryptic manner.

3.10 It is submitted that the petitioner no.2, has purchased the property and had filed suit against the petitioner no.1, as he was inducted in the year 1997. Also, another suit, was filed in the year 1999 and application, Exh.5 was allowed. The petitioner no.2 purchased the property from the petitioner no.1 by registered sale deed in the year 2003. Substantial development took place in the interregnum and the respondent had been inactive for all these years and in absence of any sufficient explanation offered, the learned Judge ought not to have allowed the application and should have rejected the same. It is therefore, urged that the captioned Civil Revision Application, deserves to be allowed.