- (1.)The Revision Petitioners are accused in C. C. No. 302 of 1982 on the file of the Second Class Magistrate's Court, Kattakada. They were charged for offences punishable under S.143, 147, 149, 447 and 427 IPC. After considering the evidence in the case, the Trial Court found that the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing that the petitioners have committed offences with which they are charged. The State which charge sheeted the case, did not tile any appeal against the order of acquittal. However, P. W. 1 filed a revision before the Court of Sessions, Trivandrum. The Sessions Court set aside the order of acquittal and sent back the case for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the said order the accused have filed this revision.
(2.)It was strenuously contended by the Counsel for the petitioner that the Sessions Court committed grave illegality and irregularity in setting aside the order of acquittal on a revision filed by the de facto complainant in a case charge sheeted by the Police and ordering retrial by the Trial Court. The learned Counsel also brought to my notice a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Bansi Lal and Others v. Laxman Singh ( AIR 1986 SC 1721 ). That was a case where the appellants were tried by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi with a charge of murder under S.302, read with S.34 of the Indian Penal Code. The son of the deceased victim of the murder preferred a criminal revision before the High Court of Delhi under S.397 and 401 Cr. P. C. challenging the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of acquittal and remanded the case to the Trial Court for fresh trial. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the interference by the High Court in the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge is clearly illegal. His Lordship v. Balakrishna Eradi J. speaking for the Bench observed as follows:
"9. Even in an appeal against an order of acquittal no interference will be made with the judgment of the Trial Court except in rare and exceptional cases where there has been some manifest illegality in the approach to the case or the appreciation of the evidence or where the conclusion of fact recorded by the Trial Judge is wholly unreasonable so as to be liable to be characterised as perverse and there has been a resultant miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is more narrow in its scope. It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the Trial Court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. In K. C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 ( AIR 1962 SC 1788 ). this Court had occasion to consider the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court in relation to orders of acquittal passed by the Trial Court and after referring to two earlier decisions of this Court reported in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla 1951 SCR 284 : ( AIR 1951 SC 196 ) and Jogendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 : ( AIR 1951 SC 316 ). the legal position was explained thus:

"These two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision; in particular, Jogendranath Jha's case stresses that it is not open to a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction in view of the provisions of S.439(4) and that the High Court cannot do this even indirectly by ordering re-trial. What had happened in that case was that the High Court reversed pure findings of facts based on the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence but formally complied with sub-s. (4) by directing only a retrial of the appellants without convicting them, and warned that the Court retrying the case should not be influenced by any expression of opinion contained in the judgment of the High Court. In that connection this Court observed that there could be little doubt that the dice was loaded against the appellants of that case and it might prove difficult for any subordinate judicial officer dealing with the case to put aside altogether the strong views expressed in the judgment as to the credibility of the prosecution witness and the circumstances of the case in ''general".

This decision was subsequently followed by this Court in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1974) 1 SCR. 130. ( AIR 1973 SC 2145 ), where this Court observed:-

"The unrestricted right of appeal from acquittal is specifically conferred only on the State and a private complainant is given this right only when the criminal prosecution was instituted on his complaint and then also subject to special leave by the High Court. It is further provided in S.439(5) Cr. P. C. that where no appeal is brought in a case in which an appeal is provided, no proceedings by way of revision would be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. The State Government, therefore, having failed to appeal, cannot apply for revision of an order of acquittal. Again on revision, the High Court is expressly prohibited from converting an acquittal into a conviction. Considering the problem facing the Court in this case in the background of this scheme, the High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal, should appropriately refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice. It is not expected to act under S.435/439, Cr. P. C. as if it is a hearing on appeal in spite of the wide language under S: 435 which empowers it to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of a finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of any proceeding and also In spite of the fact that under S.439 it can exercise inter alia the power conferred on a Court of appeal under S.423, Cr. P. C. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. Judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system. In Amarchand Aggarwal v. Shanti Bose, AIR 1973 SC, 799, this Court said that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under S.439, Cr. P. C. is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law and there has consequently been flagrant miscarriage of justice. In the background of the position just stated a private complainant can only claim a right, in common with all aggrieved parties in a criminal proceedings, to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court for redress against miscarriage of justice arising from an erroneous order of acquittal."

The same position has been reiterated by this Court in Satyendra Nath Dutta v. Ram Narain, 1975 (2) SCR 743 : ( AIR 1975 SC 580 )".

(3.)In the instant case the Trial Court has pointed out various grounds for coming to the conclusion that the prosecution has not established that the accused has committed offences with which they are charged. On analysing the evidence of the case, the Trial Court was satisfied that the prosecution has not succeeded in bringing home the offences of the accused. The learned Magistrate has pointed out that in the police charge what was alleged was that Al drove away the tapping workers whereas what was spoken to in the witness box was that all of them drove away. Some of the witnesses cited by the prosecution turned hostile. According to the learned Magistrate there is no proof of identification of the accused and the testimony of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 is silent in regard to the same. It is having taken into account all those circumstances that the Trial Court passed an order of acquittal of the accused.