JUDGEMENT
G. N. Ray, J. -
(1.)This appeal unfolds a very, said incident where on account of murder of her mother-in-law, the appellant has been convicted for such murder under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. not on the basis of any direct evidence but on the basis of circumstantial evidence led by the prosecution. It may be indicated here although the appellant was also charged under Section 302 read with 120-B, I.P.C. and under Section 302, I.P.C., the trial Court acquitted the appellant of such offences but convicted her for offence under Section 302 read with Section 34, I.P.C. Against such decision of the learned Sessions Judge, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Gujarat High Court. The State also preferred an appeal against acquittal of the appellant of the charges under Section 302 read with 120-B.I.P.C. and Section 302, I.P.C. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the State. So far as conviction under Section 302 read with 34, I.P.C. is concerned, the Judges of the Division Bench differed. One of the Judges constituting the Division Bench upheld the conviction of the appellant under Section 302/34, I.P.C. but the other Judge of the Division Bench held that the case against the appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction was based on surmise and conjecture and the accused was entitled to be acquitted. In view of such difference of opinion, the appeal was referred to a third Judge of the High Court under Section 302 of the code of Criminal Procedure. The third Judge has upheld the conviction of the appellant under Section 302/34, I.P.C. and the appeal of the appellant was, therefore, dismissed by the High Court.
(2.)Before the third Judge of the High Court reliance was made, in Empress v. Debi Singh (1886 Allahabad Weekly Notes 275), since reproduced in the decision In Re Narsiah, AIR 1959 Andh. Pra. 313, that "as a matter of judicial etiquette, when one Judge differs from his brother Judge on a pure question of the weights of evidence as to the propriety of a conviction, the opinion of the judge who is in favour of acquittal should prevail at least, as a general rule." It was contended that in view of finding by one of the members of the Division Bench that the appellant was entitled to be acquitted, such view in favour of acquittal, as a rule of prudence, should be accepted by the third Judge hearing the appeal under Section 392, Cr. P. C. The third Judge, however, by referring to several decisions of this Court has discarded such contention and has considered the appeal on merits. We feel that it will be appropriate to consider the scope and ambit of Section 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the question of acceptance of the view in favour of acquittal, as a rule of prudence or on the score of judicial etiquette by the third Judge.
(3.)The procedure to be adopted suo motu by the Court in the event of difference of opinion between the two judges, comprising the Division Bench of the High Court was first introduced in Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is to following effect:
"When the Judges comprising the Court of appeal are equally divided in opinion, the case with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before another Judge of the same Court, and such Judge after such hearing (if any) as he thinks fit shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion."