BEOPAR SAHAYAK PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. VISHWA NATH
LAWS(SC)-1987-7-51
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA (FROM: ALLAHABAD)
Decided on
July 15,1987
BEOPAR SAHAYAK PRIVATE LIMITED
Appellant
VERSUS
VISHWA NATH
Respondents
Referred Judgements :-
U J S CHOPRA VS. STATE OF BOMBAY [REFERRED TO]STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH VS. MOHAMMAD NOOH [REFERRED TO]
MADAN GOPAL RUNGTA THE TATA IRON STEEL CO LIMITED VS. SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF ORISSA :SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF ORISSA [REFERRED TO]
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS CALCUTTA VS. EAST INDIA COMMERCIAL CO LTD [REFERRED TO]
GOKARAJURANGARAJU ACHANTI SREENIVASA RAO VS. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [FOLLOWED]
Cited Judgements :-
GOVIND NARAYAN VS. NAGENDRA NAGDA [LAWS(RAJ)-2017-9-43] [REFERRED TO]SHIVCHANDRA JHUNJHUNWALA CHARITABLE TRUST VS. GOVINDPRASAD GANESHPRASAD DUBEY [LAWS(BOM)-2003-5-5] [REFERRED TO]
AMIYA KUMAR MOHANTY VS. STATE OF ORISSA [LAWS(ORI)-1993-3-13] [REFERRED TO]
SAURASHTRA MAJOOR MAHAJAN SANGH VS. UNA TALUKA KHEDUT SAHAKARI KHAND UDYOG LTD. AND ANR. [LAWS(GJH)-1993-11-36] [REFERRED TO]
KM NISHA SRIVASTAVA VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [LAWS(ALL)-2005-10-35] [REFFERED TO]
VIJAY SINGH VS. STATE OF U P [LAWS(ALL)-2004-7-30] [REFERRED TO]
Black Gold Rubber VS. State of H.P. [LAWS(HPH)-2008-6-42] [REFERRED TO]
AMIR JAMAL KHAN AND 6 ORS VS. STATE OF U P AND 4 ORS [LAWS(ALL)-2018-1-79] [REFERRED TO]
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. RAMESHWAR DAYAL [LAWS(DLH)-2023-11-188] [REFERRED TO]
U P MINISTERIAL COLLECTORATE KARMACHARI SANGH VS. STATE OF U P [LAWS(ALL)-1997-2-55] [REFERRED TO]
VADODARA GUJARATI CATHOLIC CO OPRATIVE VS. MARTIN M. PARMAR [LAWS(GJH)-2021-2-420] [REFERRED TO]
RAM SINGH VS. KANYA BAI [LAWS(RAJ)-2022-5-340] [REFERRED TO]
SHRIKANT PRASAD SRIVASTAVA VS. STATE OF BIHAR [LAWS(PAT)-1996-10-11] [REFERRED TO]
ANANTHAKRISHNAN VS. CHENTHIPERUMAL PILLAI [LAWS(KER)-1953-1-4] [REFERRED TO]
AMPM DESIGNS VS. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD [LAWS(BOM)-2021-10-235] [REFERRED TO]
ARUN KUMAR OJHA VS. MAMTA MISHRA [LAWS(CHH)-2014-3-43] [REFERRED TO]
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT SRI KASHIRAJ MAHAVIDYALAYA INTER COLLEGE VS. JOINT DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION VINDHYACHAL REGION DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS JAI [LAWS(ALL)-2005-3-228] [REFERRED TO]
RADHASHYAM PANIGRAHI VS. REGISTRAR (ADMN.), ORISSA HIGH COURT [LAWS(ORI)-2009-1-55] [REFERRED TO]
YASHODA NANDAN PATHAK VS. VISHNU KUMAR GUPTA [LAWS(ALL)-1988-8-76] [REFERRED TO]
C. ANANDANE VS. STATE [LAWS(MAD)-2014-12-256] [REFERRED TO]
SUNITY PANDEY VS. KANT PRASAD SHRIVASTAVA [LAWS(PAT)-1997-2-76] [DISTINGUISHED]
SCHOOL MANAGING COMMITTEE OF AMARAMUNDA GOVT PRIMARY SCHOOL VS. STATE OF ODISHA [LAWS(ORI)-2021-5-3] [REFERRED TO]
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. KARAMVIR SINGH [LAWS(DLH)-2023-10-39] [REFERRED TO]
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. BALESHWAR [LAWS(DLH)-2023-8-197] [REFERRED TO]
SURESH SOOD VS. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH [LAWS(HPH)-2024-1-95] [REFERRED TO]
GANESH MORTO NAIK VS. GOA STATE CO OPERATIVE BANK LIMITED [LAWS(BOM)-1991-6-31] [REFERRED TO]
PRAKASH CHANDRA VS. RITESH BHARGAWA [LAWS(ALL)-2020-8-20] [REFERRED TO]
DEBARPITA RAY VS. WEST BENGAL OF UNIVERSITY OF HEALTH SCIENCES [LAWS(CAL)-2007-5-62] [REFERRED TO]
JAGPAL SINGH YADAV VS. STATE OF U.P. [LAWS(ALL)-2024-5-21] [REFERRED TO]
MANAGING COMMITTEE OF MADRASA DARUL HODA VS. STATE OF BIHAR [LAWS(PAT)-2017-8-132] [REFERRED TO]
RAMU RAM VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-1998-4-54] [REFERRED TO]
SADANAND VS. STATE [LAWS(BOM)-2011-8-275] [REFERRED TO]
M K SIVARAJAN FORMERLY PRESIDENT VS. STATE ELECTION COMMISSION [LAWS(KER)-2006-11-173] [REFERRED TO]
M P DWIVEDI VS. M P VIDHAN SABHA SECRETARIATE BHOPAL [LAWS(MPH)-2008-1-49] [REFERRED TO]
HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LTD VS. STATE OF U P [LAWS(ALL)-2007-11-16] [REFERRED TO]
TODENDULA VENKATA KRISHNAIAH VS. UPPU GANGAIAH [LAWS(APH)-2003-4-7] [REFERRED TO]
MANGAL DEV VS. STATE ELECTION COMMISSION [LAWS(ALL)-2005-5-109] [REFFERED TO]
SAURASHTRA MAJOOR MAHAJAN SANGH VS. UNA TALUKA KHEDUT SAHAKARI KHAND UDYOG LIMITED [LAWS(GJH)-1993-11-27] [REFERRED TO]
PAPPU VENKATA RAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF ENDOWMENTS [LAWS(APH)-2005-9-99] [REFERRED TO]
DINESH KUMAR VS. CENTRAL PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT [LAWS(DLH)-2023-10-7] [REFERRED TO]
RAMU RAM VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-1998-4-12] [REFERRED TO]
KHALIL AHMED BASHIR AHMED VS. TUFELHUSSEIN SAMASBHAJI SARANGPURWALA [LAWS(SC)-1987-11-14] [RELIED ON]
CHARAN LAL SAHU RAKESH SHROUTI RAJKUMAR KESWANI NASRIN BI VS. UNION OF INDIA [LAWS(SC)-1989-12-35] [REFERRED TO]
SARJU PRASAD VS. VIIITH ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE [LAWS(ALL)-2006-7-254] [REFERRED TO]
DINESH SHARMA VS. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE COURT NO 1 LUCKNOW [LAWS(ALL)-2007-5-140] [REFERRED TO]
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT VS. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION VTH REGION [LAWS(ALL)-2006-3-281] [REFERRED TO]
SANTOSH DEVI VS. GURU TEG BAHADUR HOSPITAL SHAHDARA DELHI [LAWS(DLH)-2023-7-152] [REFERRED TO]
NORTH-WEST TRANSPORT SYNDICATE AND ORS VS. STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS [LAWS(GAU)-1988-8-27] [REFERRED]
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF HYDERABAD VS. PHILOMENA EDUCATION FOUNDATION OF INDIA [LAWS(APH)-2007-11-105] [REFERRED TO]
RAM ANAND VS. STATE OF U.P. [LAWS(ALL)-2020-3-95] [REFERRED TO]
SUKHDAYAL AND ORS. VS. STATE OF M.P. AND ORS. [LAWS(MPH)-1991-11-35] [REFERRED TO]
JAGDISH NARAYAN SHARMA VS. KATORIDEVI [LAWS(MPH)-1994-10-18] [REFERRED TO]
SURAJ SINGH DHAKAD VS. STATE OF M.P. [LAWS(MPH)-2022-8-91] [REFERRED TO]
SANTOSH KUMAR SAHU VS. DISTRICT JUDGE [LAWS(ORI)-2009-3-91] [REFERRED TO]
RAMPRAKASH VS. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH [LAWS(MPH)-1991-3-11] [REFERRED TO]
ASHOK KUMAR VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN [LAWS(RAJ)-2000-5-72] [REFERRED TO]
VINAY KUMAR "PAPPU" © BINAY KUMAR "PAPPU" S/O LATE DR.SURENDRA NATH RAI YADAV VS. STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY, URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING DEPARTMENT, [LAWS(PAT)-2010-5-224] [REFERRED TO]
MANILAL DAYAL JI & COMPANY VS. COMPETENT AUTHORITY AND INSPECTOR, CHILD LABOUR AND ORS. [LAWS(CHH)-2015-1-47] [REFERRED TO]
JUDGEMENT
Natarajan, J. -
(1.)The only question for consideration in this appeal by special leave is whether the order of release passed by the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act hereafter) is a null and void order because the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to pass the order as he did not possess the requisite qualification for being appointed as such authority.
(2.)Premises No. 58/3 Birhana Road, Kanpur is a three storeyed building and in addition it has a mezzanine floor as well. As early as in 1947, when the respondents who are brothers were minors, a portion of the ground floor and the entire first floor was leased out to the predecessor concern of the appellant by the father of the respondents. While the first floor was leased out for residential purposes, a portion of the ground floor was leased out for non-residential purposes. The respondents sought recovery of possession from the appellant of the leased portions for their residential needs and business purposes. It may be mentioned here that the respondents were already having their residence in the second floor and their business establishments in another portion of the ground floor. As the appellant refused to comply, the respondents preferred an application under S. 21 of the Act for an order of release in their favour to recover possession of the leased portions. Various defences were raised by the appellant to oppose the application but all the objections were found untenable by the Prescribed Authority and he, therefore, passed an order of release on 15-8-1975 holding that the requirement of the leased portions by the respondents for their residential and nonresidential purposes was a bona fide one and furthermore the. comparative hardship factor was more in their favour than in favour of the appellant. The findings of the Prescribed Authority were confirmed by the Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge, Kanpur) and thereafter the appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. For the first time the appellant raised a contention, by means of an amendment petition, that the order of the Prescribed Authority had been passed without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity and in such circumstances its affirmation by the Appellate Authority could not also validate it. The High Court, though it allowed the amendment petition and permitted the additional question to be raised, did not set any merit in it on account of two factors. The first was that even if the order of the Prescribed Authority was a defective one, it had become merged with the order of the Appellate Authority when it was confirmed and as such there was no room for the appellant to assail the order on the question of jurisdictional incompetence of the Prescribed Authority. Besides, the High Court was of opinion that the question of jurisdictional competence of the Prescribed Authority to pass the order of release involved adjudication upon disputed questions of fact and such an exercise was beyond the scope of proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court thereafter went into the correctness of the findings concurrently rendered by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority and found the findings to be fully in accordance with law and facts. The High Court, therefore, dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant and hence the present appeal by special leave.
(3.)For a proper comprehension of the attack made on the competence of the Prescribed Authority to pass the impugned order of release, it is necessary to set out the terms of Cl. (e) of S. 3 which defines the 'Prescribed Authority' under the Act as it stood before and after the amendment in 1974, and also the qualifications of Shri Senger who was the Prescribed Authority who had passed the order of release in this case.
(2.)Premises No. 58/3 Birhana Road, Kanpur is a three storeyed building and in addition it has a mezzanine floor as well. As early as in 1947, when the respondents who are brothers were minors, a portion of the ground floor and the entire first floor was leased out to the predecessor concern of the appellant by the father of the respondents. While the first floor was leased out for residential purposes, a portion of the ground floor was leased out for non-residential purposes. The respondents sought recovery of possession from the appellant of the leased portions for their residential needs and business purposes. It may be mentioned here that the respondents were already having their residence in the second floor and their business establishments in another portion of the ground floor. As the appellant refused to comply, the respondents preferred an application under S. 21 of the Act for an order of release in their favour to recover possession of the leased portions. Various defences were raised by the appellant to oppose the application but all the objections were found untenable by the Prescribed Authority and he, therefore, passed an order of release on 15-8-1975 holding that the requirement of the leased portions by the respondents for their residential and nonresidential purposes was a bona fide one and furthermore the. comparative hardship factor was more in their favour than in favour of the appellant. The findings of the Prescribed Authority were confirmed by the Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge, Kanpur) and thereafter the appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. For the first time the appellant raised a contention, by means of an amendment petition, that the order of the Prescribed Authority had been passed without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity and in such circumstances its affirmation by the Appellate Authority could not also validate it. The High Court, though it allowed the amendment petition and permitted the additional question to be raised, did not set any merit in it on account of two factors. The first was that even if the order of the Prescribed Authority was a defective one, it had become merged with the order of the Appellate Authority when it was confirmed and as such there was no room for the appellant to assail the order on the question of jurisdictional incompetence of the Prescribed Authority. Besides, the High Court was of opinion that the question of jurisdictional competence of the Prescribed Authority to pass the order of release involved adjudication upon disputed questions of fact and such an exercise was beyond the scope of proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The High Court thereafter went into the correctness of the findings concurrently rendered by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority and found the findings to be fully in accordance with law and facts. The High Court, therefore, dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant and hence the present appeal by special leave.
(3.)For a proper comprehension of the attack made on the competence of the Prescribed Authority to pass the impugned order of release, it is necessary to set out the terms of Cl. (e) of S. 3 which defines the 'Prescribed Authority' under the Act as it stood before and after the amendment in 1974, and also the qualifications of Shri Senger who was the Prescribed Authority who had passed the order of release in this case.
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