A.M.BHATTACHARJEE, J. - (1.)The appellant, who is a non-law person and is appearing in person, has presented his case with appreciable clarity and with good deal of dexterity so much so that it has brought back to our mind the observation of Vivian Bose, J. in Seksaria Cotton Mills, AIR 1953 SC 278 at P. 281 to the effect that the lawyers, the more learned they are in law, become more puzzled as to what advice they should give and more bewildered at the meaning of plain English words, while persons, not learned in law, may not suffer from any such confusion and bewilderment.
(2.)Admittedly, the appellant's land has been acquired by the Andaman and Nicobar Administration under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After the Collector made his Award for the acquisition, the appellant got the matter referred to the Land Acquisition Judge under S.18 of the aforesaid Act and urged that even though according to the relevant notification and declaration only 144 sq. ft. of land belonging to the appellant was to be acquired, in fact a total area of 432 sq. ft. of land was actually taken possession of by the Administration and that he was accordingly entitled to compensation for that excess area of 288 sq. ft. also. The claim of the appellant was upheld by the District Judge acting as the Land Acquisition Judge and being aggrieved thereby, the Administration appealed to this Court. A Division Bench of this Court, which heard the appeal, overturned this claim of the appellant for the alleged excess land and, if we may say so with respect, for good reasons. The authorities under the Land Acquisition Act, including a Judge hearing a reference under S.18, can award compensation for the lands acquired under the Act in accordance with the relevant notification and declaration under S.4 and S.6 of the Act and if in proceeding to acquire such lands, more lands than what were so notified and declared, are taken possession of by the authorities, such taking of possession would not amount to acquisition under the Act to justify award of compensation under the provisions of the Act. The Division Bench accordingly held that if lands in excess of the area specified in the notification and declaration were in fact taken over by the Administration, and the appellant has thus been deprived of such lands, "for that his remedy lay elsewhere," "but not by way of claiming compensation" obviously meaning thereby, claiming compensation in a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act under the provisions thereof.
(3.)The appellant has thought that "his remedy" would lie in Writ Court and, if we understood him correctly, the process of reasoning which led him to think so was that since his right to property was violated by such dispossession and deprivation and such a right was a Fundamental Right under the Constitution (as it stood then) and the Writ Courts, because of the amplitude of their powers under Art.226, are the most effective forum for speedy enforcement of Fundamental Rights, he can and should resort to that Court. Even if, as held by the Learned single Judge, such thinking was erroneous in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the appellant, in our view, may reasonably urge that he entertained the belief as to the justiciability of his case in a Writ Court in good faith. Granting of relief by way of money compensation is not an absolutely prohibited area for a Writ Court and, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Rudal Singh, money compensation may be awarded by Writ Courts in suitable cases. It may be that the "right to property" which was a Fundamental Right under Art.19(1)(g)* and Art.31 of the Constitution, has ceased to be so since the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. But it is still a Constitutional Right under Art.300A of the Constitution, and all that we know, notwithstanding the sonorous fiat in Art.13, the only difference between a Constitutional Right labelled as Fundamental Right in Part III, and a Constitutional Right not so labelled, is that while for the enforcement of the former one may straightway rush to the Supreme Court, for the enforcement of the latter right one would have to move the High Court at the first instance. And then again, as would be trite to say, one can invoke Art.226 not only for Fundamental Right, but for any legal right, Fundamental or non-Fundamental, Constitutional or Extra-Constitutional. At any rate, the appellant could have successfully claimed a Writ of Mandamus directing the Administration to pay compensation according to law, if the fact of his being deprived of his land and the extent thereof were undisputed or could be indisputably established.