JUDGEMENT
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(1.)Order impugned is the order dated 27.3.2012 vide which Additional Rent Controller (ARC) had decreed the eviction petition filed by the respondent/landlord under section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA); the application seeking leave to defend filed by the petitioner/tenant had been dismissed.
(2.)Record shows that the present eviction petition had been filed by the respondent under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25 B of the DRCA. This was qua municipal number of premises 6671, present known as plot No.D-154, Kamla Nagar, Delhi. The petitioner was inducted as a tenant of respondent no.1. He, however, illegally sublet the premises to respondent no.3. Respondent no.3 is not represented before this Court. Even otherwise the present proceedings have been filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA seeking eviction of the tenant on the bonafide need of the landlord; it is not a petition seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of subletting. This becomes relevant in view of the first objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is a mis-joinder of parties and the petition in the present form wherein the sub-tenant has been roped in is not maintainable. This objection is without any merit. Respondent no.3 even presuming has been mistakenly made a respondent, no relief has been claimed against him and he has been stated to be only a proforma respondent; the ground of subletting as detailed has only been in the narration of facts as is evident from the prayer made in the present petition, the petition is otherwise a petition seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground as contained under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA which does not apply to a sub-tenant.
(3.)In the course of the proceedings an application seeking leave to defend was filed. Apart from the aforenoted first objection it has been argued that the bonafide need as depicted in the eviction petition does not spell out the reason why the premises are required by the aforenoted two petitioners. It has been averred that the grand sons of petitioner nos.1 and 2 respectively i.e. Abhinav Goel and Abheshek Goel seek the accommodation for doing work; what is the nature of the work or business which is proposed to be carried out by them has not been explained; this proposal is only in the air as admittedly both the brothers are only in their early twenties and in the absence of any knowledge and work experience to start a business it would be unimaginable to believe that the present accommodation is required for their setting up a business which business as per the averments made in the petition is unknown. Another submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that an alternate accommodation is available with the petitioner at Shastri Nagar which factum has been concealed; on this ground alone leave to defend should be granted. The third submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that this is clearly a case of additional accommodation as is evident from the eviction petition wherein it has been averred that a firm under the name and style of M/s Hindustan Hosiery of petitioner no.2 and another firm in the name of M/s Abhinav Enterprises in the name of the wife of petitioner no.2 is being run in the ground floor of the same premises; these premises are in fact being used as a godown for the purposes of storage and these are easily available to Abhishek and Abhinav to carry out their business; present premises are thus an additional accommodation claimed by the petitioner. To support this submission reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court Santosh Devi Soni Vs. Chand Kiran, 2001 1 SCC 255 decided on 17.01.2000 in Civil Appeal No.412 of 2000; this also being a case of additional accommodation leave to defend should not be refused. Last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is bordered on a legal submission; submission being that the judgment of the Supreme Court Satyawati Sharma Vs. UOI, 2008 148 DLT 705 is wrongly being interpreted by the courts below; the ratio of the judgment is that the landlord can seek eviction of only those premises which are being used by a tenant for commercial purpose and which had initially been let out for residential purpose. The procedure of Section 14(1)(e) and 25 B of the DRCA would be inapplicable in the present case.
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