HINDUSTAN BROWN BOVERI, LIMITED Vs. THEIR WORKMEN
LAWS(SC)-1967-7-16
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Decided on July 31,1967

Hindustan Brown Boveri, Limited Appellant
VERSUS
THEIR WORKMEN Respondents


Cited Judgements :-

KANHAIYA LAL VS. DISTRICT INSPECTORS OF SCHOOL BAREILY [LAWS(ALL)-1991-9-70] [REFERRED TO]
S PRATAP REDDY VS. BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD [LAWS(APH)-1997-9-133] [REFERRED TO]
RANJIT GHOSH VS. HINDUSTHAN STEEL LTD [LAWS(CAL)-1969-3-15] [REFERRED TO]
MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION NAGPUR VS. MADHUKAR NARAYANRAO [LAWS(BOM)-1968-8-5] [REFERRED TO]
AJIT KUMAR NAG VS. GENERAL MANAGER PJ I O C LTD [LAWS(CAL)-2004-2-86] [REFERRED TO]
KARNATAKA POWER CORPORATION LTD VS. G G BHAT [LAWS(KAR)-2008-2-47] [REFERRED TO]
HECKETT ENGINEERING CO VS. THEIR WORKMEN [LAWS(SC)-1977-10-8] [DISTINGUISHED]
J.K. JUTE MILLS CO. LTD., KANPUR VS. LABOUR COURT MEERUT AND OTHERS [LAWS(ALL)-1987-4-92] [REFERRED TO]


JUDGEMENT

SHELAT, J. - (1.)THIS appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the labour court, Rohtak, in Reference No. 26 of 1965. The labour court held that the domestic inquiry held by the appellant-company against its two workmen, Samunder Lal and Arjan Singh, was a proper inquiry and the findings against the two workmen were valid. But it held that the company's works manager had to power to direct dismissal of the one and demotion of the other as under the standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 20 of 1946, it was the company and not its works manager who had the authority to pass such orders.
(2.)SRI Gokhale for the company contended that the labour court's order was erroneous in that
(i) on a proper construction of standing order 27 the works manager had the authority to pass the orders in question on a proper inquiry having been held and the said workmen having been found guilty; (ii) that assuming that the company alone had the power, the company includes its principal executive officer by reason of the definition of "employer" in Act 20 of 1946.

Besides these two contentions, he argued that the company had executed a power-of-attorney in favour of the works manager delegating thereby some of its powers including that of recruitment and dismissal of workmen that under that power-of-attorney the works manager was competent to pass the said orders, that that power could not be produced before the labour court as the court had not specifically raised the issue as to the competence or otherwise of the works manager and the contention as to the absence of his power was raised for the first time during the arguments before the labour court. He pointed out that the company had filed soon after it filed the special leave petition an application for raining an additional ground and that that application has been fixed for hearing along with this appeal. He urged that he should be allowed to produce the power-of-attorney and rely on it to show that the company has in fact delegated its aforesaid power to the works manager.We will first dispose of the first two contentions and then deal with this additional contention. Standing order 2(a) defines :

"company" or "establishment" as meaning "the Hindustan Electric Company, Ltd., Faridabad, having its head office and registered office at ... Bombay, and factories at Faridabad."

(3.)CLAUSE (b) defines "board" as the board of directors of the company. Clause (d) defines "general manager" or "manager" as meaning persons for the time being managing the establishment or anyone duly authorized to act on his behalf, and Cl. (e) defines "personnel officer" as the officer of the company in charge of the personnel department. Standing order 2 thus makes a clear distinction between the company, its board of directors and its officers, namely, the general manager or manager and the personnel officer. As the definition of the "company" shows, the company for the purposes of these standing orders means the Hindustan Electric Company, Ltd. (now designated as the Hindustan Brown Boveri, Ltd.), Faridabad, which has its head and registered office at Bombay and factories at Faridabad. In view of the clear distinction drawn in these definitions it is not possible to say that the company includes its officers. Apart from this distinction, it appears from the scheme of the standing orders that wherever a certain duty or power is sought to be entrusted to the company of its officers the standing orders say so in express terms. Thus standing orders 3 empowers the manager or the general manager in his discretion to recruit persons in the company's service at Faridabad. Standing order 12(1) authorizes the general manager or the manager or a person authorized by him to great leave to a workman depending on the exigencies of work. The procedure for such leave is by way of an application to the general manager or manager or the person authorized by him. Standing order 13 deals with causal leave and requires previous permission of the head of the department before such leave can be granted. Standing order 16, on the other hand, deals with leave for protracted illness. Clause (a) thereof provides that ordinarily a maximum period of three months' leave on account of protracted illness without pay is admissible provided the workman obtains leave from time to time from the company. Clause (b) lays down that if a workman is found to be suffering from a serious disease or is for any other reason otherwise considered by the company physically unfit for factory work, service of such a workman is liable to be terminated immediately but such a workman will be entitled to retrenchment compensation, etc., in accordance with the Industrial Disputes Act. Standing order 17 deals with reallocation of workmen returning from leave and inter alia provides that such workmen may be transferred to any piece-rate or hourly rated or daily rate or fixed to any operation irrespective of on what basis he may have been originally recruited provided the wage of the new job is not lower except in the event of his becoming extra or due for retrenchment or any other similar reason when he may either be retrenched or offered a lower-rated job at the discretion of the company. Standing order 18 provides that a workman found absent from his place of working during working hours without permission shall be presumed to be guilty of absenteeism and at the discretion of the company is liable to be treated as absent for the whole day. Such workmen, apart from being punished otherwise, will be liable to receive no wages for the period of absence. Clause (g) provides that a workman who absents himself without leave for seven consecutive days or more will be deemed to have left service but if within four days thereafter he offers an explanation to the satisfaction of the manager, his absence may be converted into leave without pay though he would be liable to be posted on similar or other inferior job carrying lower wages. Standing order 19 confers discretion on the company to promote workmen when suitable vacancies occur. Standing order 20 empowers the company at its discretion to effect transfers of workmen from one department to another or from one factory to another factory in the same State or from one operation to another operation or from an hourly fixed to piece-rate or weekly fixed and vice versa and further authorizes the company to effect transfer from one State to another State though such transfers are to be avoided and to be made with the consent of the workmen concerned. Standing order 22 defines minor offences and standing order 23 provides penalties therefor. Standing order 23 in express terms provides that the company reserves the right to inflict penalties therein set out besides those otherwise provided for. One such punishment is demotion. Standing order 25 sets out major offences which include habitual negligence or neglect of work or production of rejection in excess of permissible percentage. Standing order 26 lays down procedure for dealing with cases of major offences and provides for a preliminary as well as a final inquiry and affording of a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the workmen. Standing order 27 with which we are immediately concerned in this appeal provides by Cl. (a) that ordinarily a workman shall be liable to be summarily dismissed if he has been found guilty of a major offence. Clause (b) runs as follows :"The company may at its discretion, after taking into consideration all relevant circumstances after proper enquiry after giving the workman opportunity to defend himself, give the workman the following punishment in lieu of dismissal."


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