JUDGEMENT
SHELAT, J. -
(1.)THIS appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the labour
court, Rohtak, in Reference No. 26 of 1965. The labour court held that
the domestic inquiry held by the appellant-company against its two
workmen, Samunder Lal and Arjan Singh, was a proper inquiry and the
findings against the two workmen were valid. But it held that the
company's works manager had to power to direct dismissal of the one and
demotion of the other as under the standing orders made under the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 20 of 1946, it was the
company and not its works manager who had the authority to pass such
orders.
(2.)SRI Gokhale for the company contended that the labour court's order was erroneous in that
(i) on a proper construction of standing order 27 the works manager had the authority to pass the orders in question on a proper inquiry having been held and the said workmen having been found guilty; (ii) that assuming that the company alone had the power, the company includes its principal executive officer by reason of the definition of "employer" in Act 20 of 1946.
Besides these two contentions, he argued that the company had executed a power-of-attorney in favour of the works manager delegating thereby some
of its powers including that of recruitment and dismissal of workmen that
under that power-of-attorney the works manager was competent to pass the
said orders, that that power could not be produced before the labour
court as the court had not specifically raised the issue as to the
competence or otherwise of the works manager and the contention as to the
absence of his power was raised for the first time during the arguments
before the labour court. He pointed out that the company had filed soon
after it filed the special leave petition an application for raining an
additional ground and that that application has been fixed for hearing
along with this appeal. He urged that he should be allowed to produce the
power-of-attorney and rely on it to show that the company has in fact
delegated its aforesaid power to the works manager.We will first dispose
of the first two contentions and then deal with this additional
contention. Standing order 2(a) defines :
"company" or "establishment" as meaning "the Hindustan Electric Company, Ltd., Faridabad, having its head office and registered office at ... Bombay, and factories at Faridabad."
(3.)CLAUSE (b) defines "board" as the board of directors of the company. Clause (d) defines "general manager" or "manager" as meaning persons for
the time being managing the establishment or anyone duly authorized to
act on his behalf, and Cl. (e) defines "personnel officer" as the officer
of the company in charge of the personnel department. Standing order 2
thus makes a clear distinction between the company, its board of
directors and its officers, namely, the general manager or manager and
the personnel officer. As the definition of the "company" shows, the
company for the purposes of these standing orders means the Hindustan
Electric Company, Ltd. (now designated as the Hindustan Brown Boveri,
Ltd.), Faridabad, which has its head and registered office at Bombay and
factories at Faridabad. In view of the clear distinction drawn in these
definitions it is not possible to say that the company includes its
officers. Apart from this distinction, it appears from the scheme of the
standing orders that wherever a certain duty or power is sought to be
entrusted to the company of its officers the standing orders say so in
express terms. Thus standing orders 3 empowers the manager or the general
manager in his discretion to recruit persons in the company's service at
Faridabad. Standing order 12(1) authorizes the general manager or the
manager or a person authorized by him to great leave to a workman
depending on the exigencies of work. The procedure for such leave is by
way of an application to the general manager or manager or the person
authorized by him. Standing order 13 deals with causal leave and requires
previous permission of the head of the department before such leave can
be granted. Standing order 16, on the other hand, deals with leave for
protracted illness. Clause (a) thereof provides that ordinarily a maximum
period of three months' leave on account of protracted illness without
pay is admissible provided the workman obtains leave from time to time
from the company. Clause (b) lays down that if a workman is found to be
suffering from a serious disease or is for any other reason otherwise
considered by the company physically unfit for factory work, service of
such a workman is liable to be terminated immediately but such a workman
will be entitled to retrenchment compensation, etc., in accordance with
the Industrial Disputes Act. Standing order 17 deals with reallocation of
workmen returning from leave and inter alia provides that such workmen
may be transferred to any piece-rate or hourly rated or daily rate or
fixed to any operation irrespective of on what basis he may have been
originally recruited provided the wage of the new job is not lower except
in the event of his becoming extra or due for retrenchment or any other
similar reason when he may either be retrenched or offered a lower-rated
job at the discretion of the company. Standing order 18 provides that a
workman found absent from his place of working during working hours
without permission shall be presumed to be guilty of absenteeism and at
the discretion of the company is liable to be treated as absent for the
whole day. Such workmen, apart from being punished otherwise, will be
liable to receive no wages for the period of absence. Clause (g) provides
that a workman who absents himself without leave for seven consecutive
days or more will be deemed to have left service but if within four days
thereafter he offers an explanation to the satisfaction of the manager,
his absence may be converted into leave without pay though he would be
liable to be posted on similar or other inferior job carrying lower
wages. Standing order 19 confers discretion on the company to promote
workmen when suitable vacancies occur. Standing order 20 empowers the
company at its discretion to effect transfers of workmen from one
department to another or from one factory to another factory in the same
State or from one operation to another operation or from an hourly fixed
to piece-rate or weekly fixed and vice versa and further authorizes the
company to effect transfer from one State to another State though such
transfers are to be avoided and to be made with the consent of the
workmen concerned. Standing order 22 defines minor offences and standing
order 23 provides penalties therefor. Standing order 23 in express terms
provides that the company reserves the right to inflict penalties therein
set out besides those otherwise provided for. One such punishment is
demotion. Standing order 25 sets out major offences which include
habitual negligence or neglect of work or production of rejection in
excess of permissible percentage. Standing order 26 lays down procedure
for dealing with cases of major offences and provides for a preliminary
as well as a final inquiry and affording of a reasonable opportunity of
being heard to the workmen. Standing order 27 with which we are
immediately concerned in this appeal provides by Cl. (a) that ordinarily
a workman shall be liable to be summarily dismissed if he has been found
guilty of a major offence. Clause (b) runs as follows :"The company may
at its discretion, after taking into consideration all relevant
circumstances after proper enquiry after giving the workman opportunity
to defend himself, give the workman the following punishment in lieu of
dismissal."
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